Brazil

The Secular Decline of Manufacturing and the Rise of Commodity Dependence

Brazil’s economic trajectory from the 1980s to the 2020s is marked by a pronounced shift away from industrial production toward commodity-driven growth. This reversion is observable in the declining share of manufacturing in gross domestic product (GDP) and the increasing reliance on raw material exports, a process that accelerated after the 1980s debt crisis and intensified in the 2010s.

The GDP growth data for the 1980s shows a mean annual rate of 3.0 per cent, but the decade was characterised by volatility, with a peak of 9.2 per cent in 1980 and a trough of -4.3 per cent in 1981. This instability, coupled with hyperinflation reflected in the GDP deflator surging from 92.1 in 1980 to 1,304.4 in 1989, eroded the competitiveness of domestic manufacturing and prompted a reorientation toward primary sectors.

The 1990s brought trade liberalisation and the Real Plan, which stabilised prices—the GDP deflator fell from 2,737.0 in 1990 to 8.0 in 1999—but also exposed Brazilian industry to international competition. Manufacturing output as a share of GDP, which had peaked near 30 per cent in the mid-1980s, began a secular decline. By the end of the 1990s, GDP growth averaged just 1.7 per cent per year, with a contraction of 4.3 per cent in 1990 and a modest recovery to 0.5 per cent in 1999.

The mean GDP per capita for the decade was $3,754, a figure that masked the structural shift: the opening of the economy favoured imports of capital goods and consumer durables, while domestic firms struggled to maintain market share. The share of manufactured goods in total exports fell from roughly 55 per cent in 1990 to 45 per cent by 1999, as agricultural and mineral commodities became more prominent.

The Commodity Super-Cycle and the Masking of Structural Weakness

The 2000s represented a commodity super-cycle that temporarily masked the deindustrialisation trend. GDP grew at a mean rate of 3.4 per cent annually, with a peak of 6.1 per cent in 2004, driven by soaring demand from China for iron ore, soybeans, and crude oil. GDP per capita rose from $3,759 in 2000 to $8,660 in 2009, an increase of 130.4 per cent, and total GDP expanded by 154.5 per cent over the decade, from $655 billion to $1.67 trillion.

Manufacturing’s share of GDP continued to shrink, falling from 17.2 per cent in 2000 to 14.6 per cent in 2009, according to World Bank data.

However, the composition of this growth was heavily skewed toward commodity extraction. Manufacturing’s share of GDP continued to shrink, falling from 17.2 per cent in 2000 to 14.6 per cent in 2009, according to World Bank data. The real exchange rate appreciated during the boom, a phenomenon known as Dutch disease, which further squeezed industrial competitiveness. By 2009, the global financial crisis had brought a mild contraction of 0.1 per cent in GDP, exposing the vulnerability of a commodity-dependent economy.

The 2010s confirmed the reversion to commodity exports, with GDP contracting by 15.2 per cent in nominal terms over the decade, from $2.21 trillion in 2010 to $1.87 trillion in 2019. GDP per capita fell by 20.7 per cent, from $11,372 to $9,020, and mean annual growth was just 1.4 per cent, with a severe recession in 2015 and 2016 when output shrank by 3.5 per cent and 3.3 per cent respectively.

Persistent Stagnation and the Legacy of Deindustrialisation

Manufacturing’s share of GDP dropped below 11 per cent by 2019, its lowest level in modern Brazilian history. The economy became increasingly reliant on exports of iron ore, crude petroleum, and agricultural products such as soybeans and beef. The GDP deflator averaged 5.2 per cent for the decade, reflecting moderate inflation, but the structural shift was evident in the trade balance: commodity exports accounted for over 60 per cent of total export revenue by 2019, up from 45 per cent in 2000.

The 2020s have seen a partial recovery, with GDP growing by 47.9 per cent from 2020 to 2024, reaching $2.18 trillion, and GDP per capita rising by 45.5 per cent to $10,281. However, this expansion has been driven largely by a renewed commodity boom, with iron ore and oil prices rising after the pandemic. GDP growth averaged 2.2 per cent from 2020 to 2024, with a sharp contraction of 3.3 per cent in 2020 followed by a rebound of 4.8 per cent in 2021.

The manufacturing share of GDP has stabilised near 10 per cent, but the sector has not regained its former weight. The reversion to commodity exports has left Brazil’s economy exposed to external price cycles, a pattern that has persisted for four decades. The mean GDP per capita for the 2020s so far is $8,988, below the 2010s average of $10,803, underscoring the long-term stagnation in living standards associated with deindustrialisation.

The Fiscal-Monetary Conflict and the Collapse of Growth

Brazil’s macroeconomic trajectory in the 2010s was defined by a sharp conflict between fiscal expansion and monetary tightening. The decade began with GDP growth of 7.5% in 2010, but by 2014 the economy had entered a severe recession, with GDP contracting by 3.5% in 2015 and a further 3.3% in 2016. Over the full decade, GDP growth averaged just 1.4%, a stark deceleration from the 3.4% average of the 2000s.

This downturn was compounded by a collapse in commodity prices and political instability, but the underlying tension between fiscal policy and monetary policy became the central macroeconomic theme.

Fiscal Expansion, Monetary Tightening, and Stubborn Inflation

The fiscal response to the recession was expansionary. Government spending rose sharply, driven by social programmes, public sector wages, and pension outlays. The primary fiscal balance, which had been in surplus in 2011, turned deeply negative by 2015. By 2016, the central government’s primary deficit reached 2.5% of GDP, and gross public debt climbed from 51.3% of GDP in 2010 to 69.9% in 2016.

This fiscal expansion was at odds with the central bank’s efforts to control inflation. The GDP deflator, which had averaged 8.4% in the first half of the decade, peaked at 8.4% in 2010 and remained elevated, with annual inflation exceeding the 4.5% target band in 2011, 2013, 2014, and 2015. The Selic rate, the benchmark policy rate, was raised from 7.25% in October 2012 to 14.25% in July 2015, the highest level in nearly a decade.

The Selic rate was raised from 7.25% in October 2012 to 14.25% in July 2015, the highest level in nearly a decade.

The conflict between fiscal expansion and monetary tightening was most visible in the inflation outlook. Despite aggressive rate hikes, inflation remained stubbornly high. The GDP deflator averaged 8.4% in 2010 and 8.2% in 2011, before moderating to 5.4% in 2012 and 6.2% in 2013. In 2014, the deflator rose again to 7.3%, and in 2015 it hit 8.4%, matching the 2010 peak.

The central bank’s credibility was strained, as the fiscal expansion fuelled demand-side pressures and raised expectations of future inflation. By 2015, inflation expectations for the following year had risen above 6%, well above the 4.5% target. The monetary tightening cycle, which lasted from April 2013 to July 2015, raised the Selic rate by 700 basis points, but the fiscal stance remained stimulative, with the primary deficit widening to 1.9% of GDP in 2015.

The Spending Cap’s Inconsistent Implementation and Lingering Pressures

In response to the deteriorating fiscal position, the government introduced a constitutional spending cap in December 2016, known as the “Teto dos Gastos”. This rule limited the growth of primary federal spending to the rate of inflation in the previous year, effectively freezing real spending for 20 years. The cap was intended to signal fiscal discipline and reduce the risk premium embedded in interest rates.

In 2017, the Selic rate began to decline, falling from 13.75% in October 2016 to 6.50% in March 2018. The GDP deflator also moderated, averaging 4.2% in 2017 and 3.7% in 2018. However, the spending cap did not eliminate the tension between fiscal and monetary policy. The cap was breached in 2017 and 2018, as the government used supplementary budgets to bypass the limit, and public debt continued to rise, reaching 74.4% of GDP in 2018.

The fiscal-monetary conflict persisted through the end of the decade. In 2019, the Selic rate was cut further to 4.50% by October, but inflation remained low, with the GDP deflator falling to 4.2% in 2019. The spending cap was revised in 2019 to allow for a one-off increase in spending, but the underlying fiscal position remained weak. The primary deficit was 1.5% of GDP in 2019, and gross public debt reached 75.8% of GDP.

The decade closed with GDP growth of just 1.2% in 2019, and GDP per capita had fallen by 20.7% over the decade, from $11,372 in 2010 to $9,020 in 2019. The spending cap, while intended to restore fiscal credibility, had not resolved the structural imbalance between spending commitments and revenue capacity.

The tension between fiscal expansion and monetary tightening in the 2010s was a defining feature of Brazil’s macroeconomic environment. The spending cap was an attempt to impose fiscal discipline, but its implementation was inconsistent, and the underlying fiscal pressures remained. The result was a decade of low growth, high inflation, and rising public debt, with GDP per capita declining in real terms. The conflict between fiscal and monetary policy was not resolved by the cap, and it continued to shape Brazil’s economic outlook into the 2020s.

The Persistent Productivity Drag of Informality

Brazil’s informal sector remains a structural obstacle to sustained gains in labour productivity, a condition reflected in the country’s GDP per capita trajectory. In 2024, GDP per capita stood at $10,281, a figure that, despite a 45.5% increase from the 2020 low of $7,066, remains below the 2011 peak of $13,361.

This incomplete recovery underscores the difficulty of translating aggregate output growth into broadly shared improvements in individual output, a challenge closely tied to the size and persistence of informality.

The 2010s decade illustrates the drag of informality on productivity. GDP per capita contracted by 20.7% over the period, falling from $11,372 in 2010 to $9,020 in 2019. This decline occurred even as GDP (PPP) grew by 24.0%, from $2.69 trillion to $3.33 trillion.

The divergence between these two metrics indicates that the expansion of purchasing power was not matched by proportional gains in per capita income, suggesting that a large share of economic activity remained outside formal channels, where productivity is typically lower and wages are more volatile.

Cyclical Recovery and the Informal Safety Net

Informality in Brazil has historically absorbed workers during economic downturns and periods of weak formal job creation. During the 2020 pandemic contraction, GDP fell by 3.3% and GDP per capita dropped to $7,066, a 21.7% decline from 2019. The subsequent recovery, which lifted GDP per capita by 45.5% to $10,281 by 2024, was fuelled in part by a rebound in informal and self-employment.

While this provided a cushion against deeper social distress, it also perpetuated low-productivity work arrangements that constrain long-term output per worker.

GDP per capita in 2024, at $10,281, remains below the 2011 peak of $13,361, despite a 45.5% recovery from the 2020 low.

PPP data offers a more complete picture of the productivity gap. Brazil’s GDP (PPP) reached $4.74 trillion in 2024, nearly 2.2 times its nominal GDP, reflecting the relatively lower cost of goods and services in the domestic economy. Yet the ratio of GDP (PPP) per capita to nominal GDP per capita has widened over time, from roughly 1.6 in 2000 to 2.2 in 2024.

This widening suggests that a growing share of economic output is generated in sectors where prices are low, often informal, and where value added per worker is limited. In 2000, nominal GDP per capita was $3,759, while PPP per capita was approximately $8,711; by 2024, nominal per capita had risen to $10,281, but PPP per capita had reached $22,329. The gap implies that productivity gains in the formal economy have not been sufficient to lift the average output of all workers.

Structural Barriers and the Path to Formalisation

Labour productivity, measured as GDP per hour worked, has grown slowly in Brazil relative to other G20 economies. The 2000s saw a rapid expansion of GDP per capita, with a 130.4% increase from $3,759 to $8,660, supported by a commodity boom and rising formal employment. However, the 2010s reversed much of this progress, as GDP per capita fell by 20.7%.

The subsequent recovery in the 2020s, while positive, has not restored the peak levels of the early 2010s. This pattern indicates that productivity gains from structural reforms, such as the 2017 labour law modernisation, have been modest and unevenly distributed.

The informal sector’s persistence is reinforced by high labour costs and regulatory burdens in the formal economy. Brazil’s GDP deflator, which averaged 8.2% in the 2000s and 4.2% in the 2010s, reflects periods of high inflation that eroded real wages and encouraged informal arrangements.

In the 1980s, the deflator surged by 1,315.7%, a hyperinflationary environment that destroyed formal employment and entrenched informality as a survival strategy. The stabilisation achieved with the Real Plan in 1994 reduced inflation sharply, but the institutional legacy of informality has proven difficult to reverse.

Addressing the productivity drag from informality requires policies that reduce the cost of formalisation and improve the quality of education and training. Brazil’s GDP per capita in 2024, at $10,281, remains below the G20 average, and its PPP-adjusted figure, while higher, still lags behind peers such as Mexico and Turkey. Without a sustained reduction in informality, productivity growth will remain constrained, and the gap between potential and actual output will persist.

Agribusiness Drives Brazil’s Post-Pandemic GDP Recovery

Brazil’s economic expansion in the 2020s has been substantially driven by the agribusiness sector, with commodity exports providing a robust counterweight to the subdued performance of industry and services. GDP grew from USD 1.476 trillion in 2020 to USD 2.183 trillion in 2024, a nominal increase of 47.9 per cent over the five-year period.

This rebound followed a contraction of 3.3 per cent in 2020, the first year of the decade, and was accompanied by a recovery in GDP per capita from USD 7,066 to USD 10,281, a gain of 45.5 per cent. Agricultural output, particularly soybeans, corn, and beef, has been the primary contributor to this growth, supported by strong global demand and favourable exchange rates.

The trade balance has improved markedly as a result of rising commodity exports. Brazil recorded a trade surplus of USD 98.9 billion in 2023, the largest on record, driven by a 22 per cent increase in export volumes from 2020 levels. Agricultural products accounted for approximately 48 per cent of total exports in 2023, up from 43 per cent in 2019.

Brazil recorded a trade surplus of USD 98.9 billion in 2023, the largest on record, driven by a 22 per cent increase in export volumes from 2020 levels.

Soybeans alone represented 14 per cent of export revenues, while crude petroleum, iron ore, and sugar also featured prominently. The real effective exchange rate depreciated by roughly 20 per cent between 2020 and 2023, enhancing the competitiveness of Brazilian agricultural goods in international markets. This depreciation, combined with rising global food prices after 2021, has boosted the nominal value of exports even as volumes have grown more modestly.

Structural Shifts in GDP and the Resilience of Agribusiness

The sectoral composition of GDP has shifted accordingly. Agriculture, forestry, and fishing contributed 6.8 per cent of GDP in 2022, up from 5.5 per cent in 2019. In contrast, manufacturing’s share declined from 11.3 per cent to 10.1 per cent over the same period, reflecting deindustrialisation pressures. The services sector, which accounts for roughly 63 per cent of GDP, has grown more slowly, constrained by high interest rates and weak domestic demand.

The central bank’s Selic rate remained above 13 per cent through much of 2023, limiting credit expansion and consumption. Agribusiness, however, has been less sensitive to domestic monetary conditions, as its revenues are denominated in dollars and its input costs are largely local.

The expansion of agricultural output has been supported by technological advances and land use changes. Brazil’s agricultural frontier has moved into the Cerrado and parts of the Amazon, with planted area for soybeans increasing by 18 per cent between 2019 and 2023, to 44 million hectares. Productivity gains have also been significant: soybean yields rose from 3.2 tonnes per hectare in 2019 to 3.6 tonnes in 2023, driven by improved seed varieties and precision farming techniques.

The country is now the world’s largest exporter of soybeans, coffee, sugar, and orange juice, and the second-largest exporter of beef and corn. These products have provided a stable source of foreign exchange, helping to finance imports of capital goods and intermediate inputs for other sectors.

Risks and the Outlook for Agribusiness-Led Growth

Risks to the agribusiness-led growth model remain. Climate volatility, particularly drought in the southern states, reduced soybean output by 10 per cent in 2022 relative to the previous year. Logistical bottlenecks, including inadequate port capacity and poor road infrastructure, have constrained export growth. The government has responded with the “Logistics Investment Programme,” allocating BRL 1.7 trillion (approximately USD 340 billion) for transport projects through 2026, but implementation has been slow.

Environmental regulations, particularly those related to deforestation in the Amazon, have also created uncertainty for agricultural expansion. The European Union’s deforestation-free regulation, effective from 2025, will require Brazilian exporters to prove that their products are not linked to illegal land clearance, potentially limiting access to a key market.

Despite these challenges, agribusiness is likely to remain the principal engine of GDP growth in the near term. GDP growth averaged 2.2 per cent per year between 2020 and 2024, and the IMF projects a similar rate for 2025. The sector’s contribution to the trade balance, employment, and fiscal revenues will continue to be substantial.

However, the concentration of growth in a single sector exposes the economy to terms-of-trade shocks and structural imbalances. Diversification into higher-value-added activities, such as processed foods and bioenergy, will be necessary to sustain long-term development. For now, Brazil’s economic trajectory is closely tied to the fortunes of its farms and fields.

Bolsa Família and the 2000s Inequality Decline

The trajectory of Brazilian inequality in the modern era is inseparable from the national conditional cash transfer programme, Bolsa Família. Launched in 2003, the programme consolidated earlier transfer schemes and expanded coverage to millions of households.

By the end of the 2000s, Brazil’s GDP per capita had risen from $3,759 in 2000 to $8,660 in 2009, an increase of 130.4 per cent over the decade. This period of rapid income growth coincided with a sharp reduction in the Gini coefficient, which fell from around 0.59 in 2001 to 0.53 by 2009, driven in large part by transfers and a rising minimum wage. The combination of direct transfers and formal labour market expansion lifted consumption among the poorest deciles, contributing to a mean GDP growth rate of 3.4 per cent across the 2000s.

Stabilisation During the 2010s Recession

During the 2010s, the macroeconomic environment deteriorated. GDP per capita peaked at $13,361 in 2010 but fell to $9,020 by 2019, a decline of 20.7 per cent for the decade. Real GDP growth averaged only 1.4 per cent between 2010 and 2019, with a contraction of 3.5 per cent in 2015 and 3.3 per cent in 2016.

Despite the recession, Bolsa Família maintained its coverage at roughly 14 million families, providing a consumption floor. The programme’s transfers accounted for approximately 0.5 per cent of GDP annually, and household survey data show that the poorest quintile received over 70 per cent of their income from transfers and pensions during the worst years of the downturn. This stabilised aggregate consumption and prevented a deeper collapse in living standards, though the Gini coefficient plateaued near 0.53.

The Gini coefficient fell to 0.49 in 2020, its lowest recorded level, as emergency transfers raised disposable income for the poorest.

Pandemic Expansion and Structural Limits

The 2020s brought a new shock. GDP per capita fell from $9,020 in 2019 to $7,066 in 2020, a drop of 21.6 per cent in a single year, as the Covid-19 pandemic triggered a 3.3 per cent contraction in GDP. The government expanded Bolsa Família into the Auxílio Emergencial programme, disbursing payments of R$600 (approximately $110) per month to around 68 million beneficiaries at the peak.

This transfer injection raised disposable income for the poorest and, combined with a sharp reduction in services consumption, produced a paradoxical decline in measured inequality. The Gini coefficient fell to 0.49 in 2020, its lowest recorded level. GDP rebounded by 4.8 per cent in 2021 and 3.0 per cent in 2022, with per capita income recovering to $10,281 by 2024, a 45.5 per cent increase over the partial decade.

The structural impact of conditional cash transfers on inequality has been significant but bounded. Between 2004 and 2014, Bolsa Família explained roughly 15 to 20 per cent of the reduction in the Gini coefficient, with labour income and pension policy accounting for the remainder. The programme’s conditionality requirements, such as school attendance and health check-ups, also improved human capital indicators, though the effects on long-term productivity are debated.

Brazil’s GDP per capita in 2024, at $10,281, remains below the 2010 peak of $11,372, indicating that gains in equality have not been matched by sustained income growth. The mean GDP growth rate for the 2020s so far is 2.2 per cent, well below the 3.4 per cent average of the 2000s, suggesting that transfers alone cannot substitute for broader economic expansion.

In summary, Bolsa Família and its successors have acted as a consumption stabiliser and inequality reducer, particularly during recessions and crises. The programme’s coverage and transfer size have been adjusted cyclically, with the most generous expansion occurring in 2020. However, the long-term trajectory of inequality will depend on whether growth in GDP per capita can resume at rates seen in the 2000s, when the economy expanded by 154.5 per cent in nominal terms. Without such growth, the redistributive capacity of transfers may face fiscal constraints, limiting further progress in reducing the gap between the richest and poorest Brazilians.

The Volatility of Brazil's Growth Cycles (1980–2024)

Brazil's economic history across the five decades from 1980 to 2024 reveals a pattern of high volatility and repeated cycles of boom and bust. The data show that the economy expanded by 122.4% in nominal GDP during the 1980s, but this was accompanied by hyperinflation, as the GDP deflator surged from 92.1 in 1980 to 1,304.4 in 1989, an increase of 1,315.7%.

The 1990s brought stabilisation but anaemic growth: nominal GDP grew by only 41.7% over the decade, and GDP per capita rose by just 22.2%, from $2,863 to $3,498. The 2000s were a period of strong expansion, with nominal GDP growing by 154.5% and GDP per capita increasing by 130.4%, reaching $8,660 by 2009.

However, the 2010s reversed these gains: nominal GDP fell by 15.2%, and GDP per capita declined by 20.7%, from $11,372 in 2010 to $9,020 in 2019. The 2020s have seen a partial recovery, with nominal GDP up 47.9% and GDP per capita rising 45.5% to $10,281 by 2024, but this remains below the 2011 peak of $13,361.

GDP per capita in 2024 is $10,281, still below the 2011 peak of $13,361 — a lost decade and a half.

Structural Stagnation and the Middle-Income Trap

The structural challenge is evident in the growth rates. Average annual GDP growth has declined across successive decades: 3.0% in the 1980s, 1.7% in the 1990s, 3.4% in the 2000s, and only 1.4% in the 2010s. The 2020s, with a mean growth rate of 2.2% from 2020 to 2024, have not yet broken this pattern.

The 2010s featured two recessions: a contraction of 3.5% in 2015 and a further decline of 3.3% in 2016, followed by a slow recovery that never regained the pre-recession peak in per capita terms. The GDP deflator, which measured 4.2% in 2019, has remained moderate in the 2020s, averaging around 4.1% in 2024, indicating that inflation is not the primary constraint. Instead, the problem is low productivity growth, insufficient investment, and a fiscal framework that limits public spending on infrastructure and education.

The middle-income trap is a persistent feature of Brazil's development. GDP per capita in purchasing power parity (PPP) terms has grown, but at a decelerating rate. PPP GDP grew by 76.7% in the 1980s, 48.2% in the 1990s, 62.6% in the 2000s, and only 24.0% in the 2010s. The 2020s have seen a 41.0% increase in PPP GDP, but this is from a low base after the 2020 pandemic contraction of 3.3% in real GDP.

The economy has not yet demonstrated the ability to sustain growth above 3% per year for an extended period. Real GDP growth in 2024 was 3.4%, but the decade average of 2.2% remains below the 3.4% average of the 2000s. Without structural reforms, the risk is that Brazil will remain in a low-growth equilibrium, where per capita income stagnates around $10,000 to $11,000 in nominal terms.

Can Brazil Break Out? The 2020s Test

Several structural factors underpin this stagnation. The country's savings and investment rates are low by international standards, and the tax burden is high, reducing the incentive for private sector investment. The labour market has seen improvements in formalisation, but productivity growth has been weak. The 2020s have benefited from a commodity price boom and a recovery in domestic demand, but these are cyclical factors.

The GDP deflator, which averaged 8.4% in the 2010s and fell to 4.2% by 2019, has been stable in the 2020s, but this does not signal a structural transformation. The economy remains heavily dependent on commodity exports, particularly soybeans, iron ore, and oil, which account for a large share of export revenues. Diversification into higher value-added manufacturing and services has been limited.

Can Brazil break out of the middle-income trap? The data from the 2020s offer some cautious optimism. The economy has recovered from the 2020 pandemic shock, with real GDP growing by 4.8% in 2021, 3.0% in 2022, 2.9% in 2023, and 3.4% in 2024. This represents four consecutive years of growth above 2.5%, a record not seen since the 2000s. However, the growth rate is still below the 7.5% peak of 2010 and the 6.1% peak of 2004.

The key test will be whether Brazil can sustain growth above 3% without generating external imbalances or fiscal crises. The current account deficit has remained manageable, and foreign direct investment has been robust, but public debt remains high at around 80% of GDP. Without reforms to the pension system, tax system, and labour market, the potential growth rate is likely to remain below 3% per year.

In summary, Brazil's economic trajectory since 1980 has been characterised by high volatility, a lost decade in the 2010s, and a partial recovery in the 2020s. The middle-income trap is real: GDP per capita in 2024 is $10,281, still below the 2011 peak of $13,361. The 2020s have shown improvement, with a mean growth rate of 2.2% and a recovery in nominal GDP to $2.18 trillion by 2024. However, the structural challenges of low productivity, high public debt, and commodity dependence remain. A breakout would require sustained investment in human capital, infrastructure, and technological innovation, supported by fiscal consolidation and regulatory reform. Without these, Brazil is likely to remain in a low-growth equilibrium, with per capita income fluctuating around the $10,000 to $12,000 range.