Türkiye GDP by Sector

Current Sector Composition of GDP

In 2024, services accounted for 57.52% of Türkiye's gross domestic product, making it the largest sector by a substantial margin. Industry contributed 25.50% to GDP, while agriculture's share stood at 5.82%. This distribution reflects a mature economic structure where the tertiary sector dominates, consistent with trends observed since the 1980s.

Employment data from 2025 reinforces the dominance of services, which employed 58.49% of the workforce. Industry employed 27.29%, and agriculture employed 14.22%. The gap between agriculture's GDP share (5.82%) and its employment share (14.22%) indicates lower labour productivity in the agricultural sector relative to industry and services.

The services sector has maintained a stable share above 50% since the early 2000s, reaching 57.52% in 2024. This represents a 5.4% increase from 54.57% in 2020. The sector's resilience is notable; even during the 2010s, when its mean share was 54.08%, it never fell below 53.18% in any single year.

Industry's share of GDP has been more volatile. After peaking at 34.08% in 1994, it declined to 24.05% by 2009. A partial recovery occurred in the 2010s, with the sector averaging 27.56% of GDP. By 2024, industry stood at 25.50%, down 8.3% from 27.80% in 2020, reflecting headwinds from global supply chain shifts and domestic economic pressures.

Agriculture, despite its small GDP share, remains a persistent component of the economy. Its share has declined steadily from 26.15% in 1980 to 5.82% in 2024. The most rapid contraction occurred in the 1980s (-36.6%) and 1990s (-40.2%). In the 2020s, the decline has moderated to -15.5%, suggesting a stabilisation at a low base.

Employment in agriculture has fallen even more dramatically. From 46.06% of the workforce in 1991, it dropped to 14.22% by 2025, a decline of 69.1% over 34 years. The 2000s saw the steepest reduction at -37.0%, from 34.56% to 21.79%. This structural transformation has shifted labour into services and industry.

Industry employment has been relatively stable, moving from 22.81% in 1991 to 27.29% in 2025. The sector's employment share peaked at 28.97% in 2014 and has since edged down. Services employment has absorbed most of the labour leaving agriculture, rising from 31.13% in 1991 to 58.49% in 2025, a near-doubling over three decades.

Agriculture’s Long-Term Decline in Value-Added

Agriculture’s share of Türkiye’s GDP has contracted markedly over four decades. In the 1980s, the sector averaged 20.6% of value-added, starting at 26.1% in 1980 and ending the decade at 16.6% in 1989. By the 1990s, the mean had fallen to 13.6%, with the decade’s last value at 10.4% in 1999. The 2000s saw a further decline to a mean of 8.8%, and by 2024 agriculture accounted for just 5.8% of GDP. The total decline from 1980 to 2024 represents a 77.7% reduction in its share.

Industry’s Fluctuating Path

Industry’s share of value-added has experienced notable volatility rather than a steady trend. The sector averaged 28.5% in the 1980s, rising from 23.5% in 1980 to a peak of 33.0% in 1989. The 1990s mean was higher at 31.6%, though the decade ended at 28.3% in 1999. After a dip to a mean of 25.5% in the 2000s, industry recovered to an average of 27.6% in the 2010s. In the 2020s, the mean has been 28.6%, but the latest figure for 2024 stands at 25.5%, a decline of 8.3% from 2020.

Services as the Dominant Sector

Services have consistently been the largest contributor to Türkiye’s GDP, with its share increasing over the long term. The sector averaged 48.5% in the 1980s and 48.7% in the 1990s, before rising to a mean of 54.2% in the 2000s. The 2010s average was 54.1%, and the 2020s mean stands at 54.4%. In 2024, services reached 57.5% of value-added, the highest level in the data series. This represents a growth of 5.4% from 2020 and a 17.4% increase from the 1980 mean of 49.0%.

Turning Points and Structural Shifts

The 1990s marked a clear turning point as services surpassed the combined share of agriculture and industry. By 1999, services contributed 52.5% of GDP, while agriculture had fallen to 10.4% and industry to 28.3%. The 2001 Turkish financial crisis accelerated the shift, with services averaging 54.2% in the 2000s compared to industry’s 25.5%. Agriculture’s decline was most rapid in the 1990s, with a 40.2% drop in its share, and continued at a 25.3% decline in the 2010s.

Employment Mirrors Value-Added Trends

Employment patterns reinforce the structural transformation seen in value-added. Agriculture employed 46.1% of the workforce in 1991 but only 14.2% by 2025, a decline of 69.2%. Industry employment rose from 22.8% in 1991 to 27.3% in 2025, though it has been relatively stable since the 2000s. Services employment expanded from 31.1% in 1991 to 58.5% in 2025, absorbing the labour released from agriculture. The services sector now accounts for more than half of both GDP and employment, confirming its central role in the economy.

Employment vs Value-Added: Productivity Gaps

Agriculture in Türkiye exhibits a pronounced productivity gap relative to its share of employment. In 2024, the sector contributed 5.8% of GDP, yet employed 14.2% of the workforce in 2025. This disparity implies that labour productivity in agriculture is substantially below the national average, as the sector generates far less output per worker than industry or services.

The long-term decline in agriculture's GDP share has been steeper than its employment reduction. From 1980 to 2024, agriculture value-added fell from 26.1% to 5.8%, a contraction of 20.3 percentage points. Over the same period, agricultural employment dropped from 46.1% in 1991 to 14.2% in 2025, a decline of 31.9 percentage points. The slower relative decline in employment has sustained the productivity gap.

Industry presents a contrasting picture of higher productivity. In 2024, industry accounted for 25.5% of GDP while employing 27.3% of workers in 2025. This near-parity indicates that industrial labour productivity is close to the economy-wide average. The sector's value-added share peaked at 34.1% in the 1990s, while employment has remained relatively stable, fluctuating between 22.8% and 29.3% since 1991.

Services dominate both output and employment, with the highest labour productivity among the three sectors. In 2024, services contributed 57.5% of GDP but employed 58.5% of workers in 2025. This near-equal share suggests services productivity is broadly aligned with the national average. The sector's GDP share has grown steadily from 49.0% in 1980 to 57.5% in 2024, while employment rose from 31.1% in 1991 to 58.5% in 2025.

The productivity gap in agriculture is most stark when comparing output per worker ratios. Using the 2024 value-added shares and 2025 employment data, agriculture's share of GDP (5.8%) is less than half its share of employment (14.2%). In contrast, industry's GDP share (25.5%) is 93% of its employment share (27.3%), and services' GDP share (57.5%) is 98% of its employment share (58.5%).

Structural transformation has accelerated the shift away from agriculture. Between 2000 and 2024, agriculture's value-added share declined from 10.0% to 5.8%, a drop of 4.2 percentage points. Agricultural employment fell from 34.6% in 2000 to 14.2% in 2025, a reduction of 20.4 percentage points. This movement of labour to higher-productivity sectors has been a key driver of overall economic growth.

Policy implications centre on raising agricultural productivity to close the gap. The sector's mean value-added share in the 2020s is 6.3%, while its mean employment share is 15.7%. Even at the 2010s mean of 7.0% GDP share and 20.7% employment share, the disparity persisted. Addressing this requires investment in technology, infrastructure, and skills to boost output per worker in agriculture.

Trade, Specialisation, and Growth Implications

Türkiye's export structure reflects a gradual shift from agriculture toward industry and services. In 2024, industry contributed 25.5% of GDP, and services 57.5%, while agriculture accounted for just 5.8%. This sectoral composition, combined with a labour force that in 2025 had 27.3% in industry and 58.5% in services, indicates a maturing economy. However, the high-tech export share remains modest, limiting value-added gains. Between 2010 and 2019, industry value added grew by only 10.4%, and from 2020 to 2024 it contracted by 8.3%, suggesting that industrial specialisation has not accelerated into higher-technology production.

The middle-income trap is a persistent risk for economies like Türkiye, where productivity improvements have not matched the pace of structural transformation. Agriculture's share of employment fell from 46.1% in 1991 to 14.2% in 2025, a decline of 31.9 percentage points, yet its GDP share dropped from 17.5% to 5.8% over a similar period. This implies that labour moved out of low-productivity agriculture but did not always enter high-productivity sectors. Industry employment remained nearly flat at 27.3% in 2025, while services employment rose to 58.5%, a sector that often exhibits slower productivity growth than manufacturing.

Export growth has been driven by manufacturing, but the composition matters for long-term development. Between 2000 and 2009, industry value added declined by 10.3%, and between 2010 and 2019 it recovered by only 10.4%. This modest expansion, alongside a services sector that grew by 3.4% in the 2010s, suggests that Türkiye has not yet achieved the high-tech export specialisation seen in advanced economies. Without a higher share of technology-intensive exports, the economy risks stagnating at middle-income levels, as productivity gains from structural change diminish.

Policy efforts to boost high-tech exports and R&D investment are critical. The services sector, which contributed 57.5% of GDP in 2024, has grown steadily: from 48.1% in 1990 to 52.8% in 2000, and then to 57.3% in 2009. This expansion has absorbed labour from agriculture, but its productivity growth has been uneven. For Türkiye to escape the middle-income trap, the industrial sector must increase its share of high-value-added production. The 2025 employment data, with 27.3% in industry and 58.5% in services, indicates that the labour force is already heavily tertiary, yet export data show room for improvement in technological sophistication.

International comparisons highlight the gap. While Türkiye's industry value added as a share of GDP stood at 25.5% in 2024, comparable economies in Eastern Europe have higher high-tech export ratios. The agricultural sector, at 5.8% of GDP, continues to shed labour, but the pace of productivity improvement in services has been insufficient to drive rapid per capita income convergence. Without a structural push toward higher-technology manufacturing and knowledge-intensive services, the economy may remain in a low-growth equilibrium. The 2020s data show services value added growing by 5.4%, but industry contracting by 8.3%, a pattern that does not favour productivity-led growth.