China vs Brazil: GDP, Growth & Trajectory

Turning Point

In 2024, China's GDP stood at $18.75T versus Brazil's $2.18T — a ratio of 8.59x. That single metric captures the cumulative divergence of two continental-scale economies that, as recently as 1990, were roughly the same nominal size. The gap did not emerge gradually; it was carved out in two distinct accelerations — China's post-2001 WTO accession boom and the commodity-driven Brazilian decade that ended with the 2014-2016 recession from which the country never fully recovered its relative position. Understanding the turning point requires examining not a single year but the mechanism by which China converted its demographic base into manufacturing output while Brazil's growth remained tethered to external commodity demand cycles.

In 1990, China's nominal GDP was $379.5B and Brazil's was $423.0B, according to World Bank data. Brazil was larger. Per capita, the disparity was starker: China recorded $333 to Brazil's $2,863 — a 8.6x advantage for Brazil. The subsequent three decades inverted both relationships. The turning point for aggregate GDP arrived during the 1990s, when China's economy, measured in nominal USD, crossed above Brazil's and never looked back. By 2000, China stood at $1.22T versus Brazil's $655.5B. The per-capita turning point came later — around 2020 — when China's $10,661 surpassed Brazil's $7,066 for the first time. The two turning points, separated by roughly two decades, reflect fundamentally different growth models: one built on manufacturing productivity and capital accumulation, the other on resource exports and domestic consumption.

The structural break can be traced to policy choices made in the late 1970s and early 1980s. China's 1978 reform and opening-up, followed by gradual marketization through the 1980s and 1990s, created a framework for sustained double-digit growth. Brazil, by contrast, endured the Lost Decade of the 1980s following the 1982 debt crisis, with hyperinflation that was only tamed by the Plano Real in 1994. By the time Brazil achieved macroeconomic stability, China had already locked in two decades of manufacturing-led expansion. The commodity supercycle of the 2000s gave Brazil a temporary tailwind — GDP reached $2.21T by 2010, with per-capita income peaking at $11,372 — but the end of that cycle exposed the underlying productivity weaknesses that the Chinese model, for all its imbalances, had systematically addressed through infrastructure investment and industrial policy.

The ratio of 8.59x in 2024, therefore, is not merely a snapshot; it is the compound result of diverging investment rates, export competitiveness, and institutional capacity over four decades. The per-capita ratio of 1.29x tells a more nuanced story — one in which Brazil, despite its aggregate size being dwarfed, maintains a standard of living closer to China's than the headline GDP gap suggests. This tension between aggregate scale and individual prosperity runs through every dimension of the comparison that follows.

Current State

As of 2024, the two economies operate at fundamentally different scales, though their growth rates have converged somewhat compared with historical norms. China's GDP reached $18.75T, according to World Bank data, while Brazil's stood at $2.18T. In purchasing-power-parity terms, the gap narrows from 8.59x to 8.06x — China at $38.20T PPP versus Brazil at $4.74T PPP — reflecting the fact that price levels in Brazil are higher relative to the United States than those in China. The PPP adjustment does not erase the aggregate disparity, but it does highlight that Brazil's real domestic consumption capacity is somewhat understated by the nominal exchange-rate comparison.

On a per-capita basis, the two countries are far closer than aggregate figures imply. China's GDP per capita in 2024 was $13,309, while Brazil's was $10,281 — a ratio of 1.29x. In PPP terms, China's per-capita GDP reached $27,118 versus Brazil's $22,321, a ratio of 1.21x. Both metrics place China approximately 20-30% ahead of Brazil at the individual level, a gap that has opened only in the past five years. As recently as 2010, Brazil's per-capita GDP of $11,372 was nearly 2.5 times China's $4,604. The speed of China's per-capita catch-up — and subsequent overtaking — is one of the more consequential economic narratives of the 21st century.

Growth dynamics in 2024 reveal a Chinese economy expanding at 4.99% against Brazil's 3.41%. The difference of roughly 1.6 percentage points is modest by historical standards — during the 2000s, China frequently grew 6-8 points faster — but in absolute terms, it still adds approximately $935B to Chinese GDP annually versus roughly $74B for Brazil. Inflation presented a contrast: China registered 0.22% consumer price inflation in 2024, reflecting weak domestic demand and property-sector deflationary pressures, while Brazil posted 4.37%, above its central bank's target range according to Banco Central do Brasil data. The inflation differential shaped divergent monetary policy stances through the year, with the People's Bank of China maintaining accommodative conditions while the Banco Central do Brasil tightened.

Labor markets also diverged. China's unemployment rate was 4.62% in 2025, according to the latest available estimate, with particular weakness in youth employment that prompted government intervention measures. Brazil's unemployment stood at 5.97% for the same period, down from double-digit levels earlier in the decade but still structurally higher than China's reported figure. Life expectancy, measured in 2023 by the World Bank, placed China at 77.95 years and Brazil at 75.85 years — a gap of 2.1 years that reflects differences in healthcare infrastructure, pollution exposure, and public health outcomes across both populations.

• Aggregate GDP (nominal, 2024): China $18.75T | Brazil $2.18T (World Bank)
• GDP PPP (2024): China $38.20T | Brazil $4.74T (World Bank)
• Per-capita GDP (2024): China $13,309 | Brazil $10,281 (World Bank)
• GDP growth (2024): China 4.99% | Brazil 3.41% (World Bank)
• Inflation (2024): China 0.22% | Brazil 4.37% (World Bank)
• Population (2024): China 1.41B | Brazil 212.0M (World Bank)
• Life expectancy (2023): China 77.95 years | Brazil 75.85 years (World Bank)
• Unemployment (2025): China 4.62% | Brazil 5.97% (latest estimates)

Historical Trajectory (1960-2024)

The seven decades from 1960 to 2024 contain one of the most dramatic economic divergences in modern history. In 1960, China's GDP of $59.8B was roughly 3.5 times Brazil's $17.0B, according to World Bank data. Per capita, however, Brazil's $235 was 2.6 times China's $90. Both countries were overwhelmingly agrarian, with low urbanization rates and limited industrial bases. China was in the aftermath of the Great Leap Forward; Brazil was entering the final phase of its import-substitution industrialization drive under President Juscelino Kubitschek. The starting points were broadly comparable in aggregate, with Brazil marginally ahead in individual prosperity.

By 1980, the divergence had begun to take shape, but not yet decisively. China's GDP reached $247.5B, while Brazil's climbed to $191.6B — a ratio of 1.29x. The per-capita story remained firmly in Brazil's favor: $1,594 versus China's $251, a gap of 6.4x. This decade was pivotal for what did not happen: China began its reform program in 1978, dismantling collective agriculture and opening special economic zones, while Brazil suffered the 1982 debt crisis that triggered a decade of stagnant incomes, triple-digit inflation, and fiscal paralysis. The 1980s are often referred to in Brazilian economic historiography as the "Lost Decade" — a term that the subsequent data would validate.

The 1990 snapshot captures the crossover moment. China's GDP of $379.5B still trailed Brazil's $423.0B in nominal terms, but the gap had narrowed to 0.90x. China's per-capita income of $333 remained a fraction of Brazil's $2,863 — an 8.6x difference — reflecting China's much larger population denominator of approximately 1.14B versus Brazil's 148M. The subsequent decade, however, decisively broke the symmetry. By 2000, China's GDP of $1.22T was nearly double Brazil's $655.5B. China's per-capita GDP of $966 still lagged Brazil's $3,759, but the compound annual growth rate of the Chinese economy through the 1990s — driven by manufacturing exports, foreign direct investment, and infrastructure spending — had established a trajectory that Brazil's commodity-dependent growth model could not match.

The 2000s marked the furthest extension of the commodity supercycle and the last period in which Brazil's per-capita advantage widened. By 2010, China's GDP reached $6.17T and Brazil's hit $2.21T — a ratio of 2.79x. Brazil's per-capita GDP peaked at $11,372, more than double China's $4,604. Iron ore, soybeans, and crude oil exports to China drove Brazilian growth, while China's own expansion was powered by the largest urbanization and infrastructure buildout in history. Both countries benefited from the same global liquidity conditions, but China's growth was more domestically anchored through investment, while Brazil's was more externally dependent through commodity receipts.

The 2010-2020 decade reversed these dynamics. The end of the commodity boom after 2011, followed by Brazil's severe recession of 2014-2016 — during which GDP contracted by roughly 7% cumulatively — and the political crisis surrounding the impeachment of President Dilma Rousseff, erased much of the previous decade's gains. By 2020, China's GDP stood at $15.05T while Brazil's had contracted to $1.48T, yielding a ratio of 10.2x — the widest in the entire series. The per-capita crossover occurred during this window: China's $10,661 surpassed Brazil's $7,066 for the first time. A Brazilian citizen in 2010 earned roughly 2.5 times their Chinese counterpart; by 2020, they earned 34% less.

The 2024 data confirm the durability of this realignment. China's GDP of $18.75T and Brazil's $2.18T produced a ratio of 8.59x, narrower than the 2020 peak of 10.2x due to a partial Brazilian recovery and the depreciation of the US dollar against the Brazilian real in 2023-2024. Per-capita GDP in China reached $13,309 against Brazil's $10,281, a ratio of 1.29x. The trajectory from 1960 to 2024 is not linear — it contains inflection points at 1990 (aggregate crossover), 2010 (per-capita peak for Brazil), and 2020 (per-capita crossover) — but its direction is unambiguous: a wholesale inversion of relative economic positions driven by differential productivity growth, demographic trajectories, and institutional capacity.

China vs Brazil — Historical GDP and Per-Capita GDP (1960-2024)
Source: World Bank. GDP in nominal USD billions; per-capita in nominal USD.

Year	China GDP (B USD)	Brazil GDP (B USD)	China/Brazil GDP Ratio	China Per-Capita ($)	Brazil Per-Capita ($)	Per-Capita Ratio
1960	59.8	17.0	3.52x	90	235	0.38x
1980	247.5	191.6	1.29x	251	1,594	0.16x
1990	379.5	423.0	0.90x	333	2,863	0.12x
2000	1,220	655.5	1.86x	966	3,759	0.26x
2010	6,170	2,210	2.79x	4,604	11,372	0.40x
2020	15,050	1,480	10.17x	10,661	7,066	1.51x
2024	18,750	2,180	8.59x	13,309	10,281	1.29x

Per Capita Reality

The per-capita trajectory between China and Brazil tells a story that is distinct from — and in key respects more revealing than — the aggregate GDP comparison. As late as 2010, a Brazilian citizen enjoyed a nominal income of $11,372, compared with $4,604 for a Chinese citizen, a ratio of 2.47x in Brazil's favor. By 2024, the relationship had fully inverted: China's $13,309 versus Brazil's $10,281 represents a 1.29x advantage for China. In PPP terms, the inversion is slightly less pronounced — China's $27,118 against Brazil's $22,321, or 1.21x — but the direction is identical. The per-capita crossover, estimated to have occurred around 2020 when China reached $10,661 and Brazil fell to $7,066, marks a threshold of global significance: for the first time in modern history, the average Chinese citizen had become materially better-off than the average Brazilian, as measured by market exchange rates.

The mechanism behind this inversion is twofold. On the Chinese side, sustained GDP growth averaging above 9% annually for three decades (1980-2010) compounded against a population growth rate that decelerated sharply after the one-child policy, yielding rapid per-capita gains. On the Brazilian side, the commodity-driven growth of the 2000s lifted per-capita income to a peak of $11,372 in 2010, but the subsequent collapse — driven by the commodity-price downturn, a fiscal crisis, and political dysfunction — erased those gains. By 2015, Brazil's per-capita GDP had fallen to $8,750; by 2020, it had dropped further to $7,066. The Brazilian per-capita decline from 2010 to 2020 was approximately 38%, one of the steepest peacetime deteriorations in any major emerging economy in the 21st century.

It is important to qualify what the per-capita figures capture and what they obscure. China's per-capita GDP of $13,309 in 2024 sits just above the World Bank's high-income threshold, yet internal inequality — measured by a Gini coefficient that, according to OECD estimates, has remained above 0.45 — means that large segments of the population, particularly in inland provinces, experience living standards closer to those of upper-middle-income countries. Brazil's per-capita GDP of $10,281 places it in the upper-middle-income category, but Brazil's Gini coefficient, while declining since the early 2000s, remains among the highest in the world according to IBGE data. Both countries, therefore, exhibit a gap between average per-capita income and the typical household experience. The PPP adjustment narrows cross-country gaps — China's cost of living, particularly for non-traded services, is lower than Brazil's relative to the US — but does not erase the central finding: the average Chinese citizen was poorer than the average Brazilian for most of the past six decades and is now modestly richer.

The future trajectory of the per-capita ratio depends on growth differentials and exchange-rate movements. If China sustains growth of 4-5% annually and Brazil grows at 2-3%, the Chinese per-capita advantage will widen further, potentially reaching 1.5x by 2030. If Chinese growth decelerates toward 3% — a scenario consistent with IMF WEO projections for the late 2020s — and Brazil's stabilizes, the ratio could plateau. The per-capita story, more than the aggregate GDP story, encapsulates the lived experience of convergence and divergence between the two populations.

Sector Composition

The sectoral structures of the Chinese and Brazilian economies reveal fundamentally different specializations. According to 2024 World Bank data, China's agriculture sector accounted for 6.78% of GDP, compared with Brazil's 5.75%. The difference, at just over one percentage point, understates the contrast in agricultural orientation. Brazil is one of the world's largest net exporters of agricultural commodities — soybeans, beef, poultry, coffee, sugar, and orange juice — with the sector's weight in exports far exceeding its GDP share. According to UN Comtrade data, agricultural products constituted roughly 40% of Brazil's total export basket by value in 2023. China, by contrast, runs a structural agricultural trade deficit and has become the world's largest importer of soybeans, much of it sourced from Brazil. The similarity in the agriculture-to-GDP ratio masks diametrically opposite trade positions.

Industry is where the divergence becomes stark. China's industrial sector — comprising manufacturing, mining, construction, and utilities — represented 36.48% of GDP in 2024, against Brazil's 20.94%. This gap of roughly 15.5 percentage points is the single most important structural difference between the two economies. China's industrial base is the largest in the world by output, spanning electronics, machinery, chemicals, steel, automotive production, and renewable-energy equipment. Brazil's industrial sector, which once accounted for over 30% of GDP in the 1980s, has undergone a process of premature deindustrialization, according to research published by UNCTAD and Brazilian economists. The manufacturing component of Brazilian industry has been particularly affected, squeezed between high domestic costs — the so-called "Custo Brasil" encompassing logistics bottlenecks, complex taxation, and regulatory burdens — and competition from Asian imports, including from China itself.

Services dominate both economies but in different compositions. China's services sector contributed 56.75% of GDP in 2024, while Brazil's reached 59.17%. The Brazilian services share, somewhat paradoxically, reflects the relative shrinkage of its industrial base rather than the absolute sophistication of its service industries. Both countries have large financial sectors, retail trade, and real estate components. China's services sector increasingly incorporates digital platforms, fintech, and e-commerce at globally significant scale — firms such as Alibaba and Tencent operate ecosystems with no Brazilian equivalent in scope. Brazil's service sector, the largest in Latin America, is more domestically oriented and includes a substantial informal component that, according to IBGE household surveys, may account for 30-40% of service employment. The broad sectoral shares — roughly 57% services in China, 59% in Brazil — appear similar, but the productivity, exportability, and technological intensity of those services differ considerably.

Trade Relationship Between the Two

The bilateral trade relationship between China and Brazil has been one of the defining economic partnerships of the 21st century. China became Brazil's largest trading partner in 2009, displacing the United States, and has held that position continuously since, according to data from Brazil's Ministry of Development, Industry, Trade and Services (MDIC) and UN Comtrade. The relationship is structured around a clear pattern: Brazil exports primary commodities — soybeans, iron ore, crude petroleum, and beef — to China, while importing manufactured goods including electronics, machinery, chemicals, and consumer products. This pattern mirrors the broader China-Latin America trade dynamic documented by the UN Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), in which South America functions as a commodity supplier to Chinese manufacturing supply chains.

The commodity concentration of Brazilian exports to China is extreme by international standards. Iron ore and soybeans alone have, in recent years, accounted for over 60% of Brazil's total exports to China by value, according to Brazilian customs data compiled by MDIC. A smaller set of products — crude oil, beef, poultry, cellulose, and manganese — brings the share of primary and semi-processed goods above 85%. This concentration makes Brazilian export revenues highly sensitive to Chinese fixed-asset investment cycles (for iron ore) and food demand patterns (for soybeans and meat). A deceleration in Chinese construction activity, as observed in 2022-2024 amid the property-sector downturn, translates almost mechanically into lower iron ore volumes and prices, compressing Brazil's terms of trade.

From China's perspective, Brazil is a strategic source of food security and raw materials. China imported approximately 60% of globally traded soybeans in 2023, according to Chinese customs data, with Brazil supplying roughly two-thirds of that volume. The dependence is mutual: Brazil needs the export revenue; China needs the protein feedstock for its livestock industry. This mutual dependence has proven resilient to political cycles in both countries. Brazilian exports to China continued to grow through the Bolsonaro administration (2019-2022) despite rhetorical tensions, and have expanded further under the Lula administration's renewed emphasis on the "strategic partnership" framework. According to WTO trade monitoring reports, neither country has imposed significant trade-restrictive measures on the other's core export categories, though Brazilian industry associations have repeatedly raised concerns about the competitive pressure of Chinese manufactured imports on domestic producers.

The trade balance has been consistently in Brazil's favor over the past decade. Brazil runs a structural surplus with China driven by the commodity export base, while running deficits with much of the rest of the world in manufactured goods. Chinese foreign direct investment in Brazil, concentrated in electricity generation, oil and gas extraction, and infrastructure, has complemented the trade relationship, with cumulative Chinese FDI stock in Brazil estimated by the Brazil-China Business Council (CEBC) to exceed $70B by 2023. This investment has been both welcomed — for its role in financing infrastructure gaps — and scrutinized, particularly in sectors deemed strategic by Brazilian regulatory agencies. The trade and investment relationship, for all its asymmetry, has become a structural feature of both economies' external sectors, unlikely to be meaningfully reshaped by short-term policy shifts.

Demographics & Future Outlook

Demography increasingly shapes the growth prospects of both countries, albeit in opposite directions. China's population stood at 1.41B in 2024, according to World Bank data, and has begun to decline in absolute terms — a trend confirmed by China's National Bureau of Statistics in 2022 and projected to accelerate through the 2030s. Brazil's population reached 212.0M in 2024 and, though still growing, is decelerating rapidly. According to IBGE projections, Brazil's population is expected to peak around 2040-2045 at roughly 230M before beginning its own decline. Neither country, therefore, can rely on population expansion as a driver of GDP growth in the coming decades; both must generate per-capita income gains through productivity improvements.

The working-age population dynamics, however, differ substantially. China's working-age population (conventionally defined as ages 15-64) peaked around 2013-2014 and has been shrinking since, according to census and survey data. The United Nations Population Division projects that China's working-age cohort could contract by roughly 200M between 2020 and 2050. Brazil's working-age population, by contrast, is still expanding — albeit at a decelerating rate — and is not expected to peak until the late 2030s. This gives Brazil a demographic window, sometimes termed a "demographic dividend," during which the ratio of working-age to dependent population remains favorable. Whether Brazil capitalizes on this window depends on labor-market formalization, educational quality, and productivity growth — areas where, according to OECD Economic Surveys of Brazil, historical performance has been weak.

The IMF World Economic Outlook (WEO) projections provide a framework for assessing the medium-term trajectory. While specific year-by-year projections are subject to revision, the general contours are well-established: Chinese growth is expected to decelerate from the 5% range toward 3-4% by the late 2020s, reflecting diminishing returns to capital accumulation, a shrinking labor force, and the structural drag of the property-sector adjustment. Brazil's growth is projected in the 2-3% range, constrained by low investment rates (gross fixed capital formation has hovered around 15-18% of GDP for much of the past decade, compared with China's 40%+), a complex tax system, and infrastructure deficits. The growth differential, therefore, is likely to narrow from the 3-6 percentage-point gap of the 2000s to perhaps 1-2 points, but China's much larger base means that even a narrowing differential translates into a widening absolute gap for years to come.

The demographic contrasts extend to age structure. China's old-age dependency ratio is rising sharply — the cohort aged 65 and above now exceeds 15% of the population and is projected by the UN to reach 26% by 2050. Brazil faces a similar long-term aging trajectory, but with a roughly 15-20 year lag. Life expectancy, measured at 77.95 years for China and 75.85 years for Brazil in 2023 according to World Bank data, will continue to rise in both countries, placing further strain on pension and healthcare systems. China's rapid aging is arguably the more acute challenge, given that it is occurring at a lower per-capita income level than was the case for advanced economies that aged earlier — a phenomenon economists refer to as "getting old before getting rich." Brazil, with its later demographic transition, retains somewhat more time to build the institutional and fiscal capacity required to manage an aging society, though its historical record on pension reform, as documented by the OECD, has been mixed.

FAQ

How much larger is China's economy than Brazil's?

In 2024, China's nominal GDP of $18.75T was 8.59 times larger than Brazil's $2.18T, according to World Bank data. In purchasing-power-parity terms, the ratio narrows to 8.06x, with China at $38.20T and Brazil at $4.74T.

When did China's GDP overtake Brazil's?

The crossover occurred during the early-to-mid 1990s. In 1990, Brazil's GDP of $423.0B still exceeded China's $379.5B, but by 2000, China had surged to $1.22T while Brazil stood at $655.5B. The Chinese economy's sustained double-digit growth through the 1990s, combined with Brazil's macroeconomic instability during that decade, produced the decisive shift.

Is the average Chinese citizen richer than the average Brazilian today?

Yes, as of 2024, China's GDP per capita of $13,309 exceeded Brazil's $10,281 by a ratio of 1.29x, according to World Bank data. In PPP terms, China's $27,118 per capita was 1.21 times Brazil's $22,321. The crossover occurred around 2020, when China's per-capita GDP reached $10,661 against Brazil's $7,066. Prior to 2020, Brazil had maintained a per-capita advantage for the entire post-1960 period.

What does Brazil export to China?

Brazil's exports to China are dominated by primary commodities. According to Brazilian customs data (MDIC) and UN Comtrade, iron ore and soybeans alone account for over 60% of the export basket. Crude petroleum, beef, poultry, cellulose, and manganese make up most of the remainder. The concentration means that over 85% of Brazilian exports to China by value consist of primary or semi-processed goods.

Why did Brazil's per-capita GDP fall after 2010?

Brazil's per-capita GDP peaked at $11,372 in 2010, driven by the commodity supercycle. The subsequent decline — to $7,066 by 2020 — resulted from the end of the commodity boom, a severe recession in 2014-2016 that contracted GDP by roughly 7% cumulatively, political instability surrounding the 2016 presidential impeachment, and a slow recovery hampered by fiscal constraints. The COVID-19 pandemic added further pressure in 2020.

Does China depend on Brazil for food?

Yes, to a significant degree. China is the world's largest soybean importer, sourcing roughly two-thirds of its soybean imports from Brazil, according to Chinese customs data. Soybeans are critical to China's livestock feed industry. Brazil is also a major supplier of beef and poultry to the Chinese market. The relationship represents a mutual dependency: China needs the protein inputs, while Brazil depends on the export revenue.

How do inflation rates compare between China and Brazil?

In 2024, China's consumer price inflation was 0.22%, reflecting weak domestic demand and property-sector deflationary pressures, according to World Bank data. Brazil's inflation stood at 4.37%, above the central bank's target. The differential is historically typical: Brazil has experienced higher and more volatile inflation than China for most of the past four decades, owing to different monetary policy frameworks and exposure to exchange-rate pass-through.

Which country has a larger industrial sector?

China's industrial sector — encompassing manufacturing, mining, construction, and utilities — represented 36.48% of GDP in 2024, compared with 20.94% in Brazil, per World Bank data. In absolute terms, China's industrial output is the largest in the world. Brazil's industrial share has been declining since the 1980s, a process of premature deindustrialization documented by UNCTAD and Brazilian economic researchers.

Will China's population decline affect its growth?

Yes. China's population of 1.41B in 2024 has already begun to decline, and the working-age cohort (ages 15-64) has been shrinking since approximately 2013-2014. The IMF and other forecasters project that demographic headwinds will reduce potential growth by 0.5-1.0 percentage points annually through the 2030s. Combined with diminishing returns to capital accumulation, this is a primary reason medium-term growth projections cluster in the 3-4% range, down from historical rates of 6-10%.

Is Brazil's economy growing faster than China's now?

No. In 2024, China grew at 4.99% while Brazil grew at 3.41%, according to World Bank data. The growth differential of approximately 1.6 percentage points is narrower than the 6-8 point gaps typical of the 2000s. While some quarterly readings may show Brazil outpacing China temporarily — particularly given the volatility of commodity-linked growth — the trend growth differential still favors China, and China's much larger base means absolute additions to output remain far greater.