France vs Russia: GDP, Growth & Trajectory

Turning Point

In 2024, France's GDP stood at $3.16T versus Russia's $2.17T — a ratio of 1.45x. That nominal gap captures the surface but obscures a deeper story. Adjusted for purchasing power, Russia's economy ballooned to $6.93T in 2024, eclipsing France's PPP GDP of $4.34T, according to World Bank data. The divergence between these two measures reveals how currency movements, price levels, and sectoral structures can invert the headline rankings. While nominal exchange rates favor the eurozone's mature, service-heavy economy, Russia's resource extraction delivers far greater domestic purchasing power than its dollar‐denominated output suggests. For a journalist measuring relative economic weight, the turning point is not merely the 1.45x nominal ratio; it is the moment the PPP lens flips the narrative, pushing France into the shadow of a physically larger but institutionally strained economy.

The per‐capita lens sharpens the contrast further. France's GDP per capita reached $46,145 in 2024, while Russia's stood at $14,880 — a ratio of 3.10 times. Even after equalizing for price differences, French residents enjoyed $63,399 per head in PPP terms versus $47,418 for Russians. The 3.10x nominal multiplier, which has widened from roughly 6.2x in 2000, captures the cumulative effects of decades of divergence in productivity, social infrastructure, and industrial modernization. This gap, though partially softened by PPP adjustment, remains the single most important indicator of living‐standard asymmetry between the two nations.

The turning point also coincides with a rare growth reversal. Russia's economy expanded by 4.34% in 2024, outpacing France's 1.15%. That growth, driven by defense spending, import substitution under sanctions, and resilient commodity exports, according to the IMF, illustrates an economy structurally adapted to crisis but starved of the long-term capital and technology transfers that sustain French productivity. France's lower growth reflects a mature, high-income economy constrained by demographic stagnation, rigid labor markets, and careful fiscal consolidation, as the OECD has noted. The year 2024, then, marks a moment when Russia's nominal GDP still lags but its growth momentum and real purchasing power challenge the usual pecking order.

The point is sharpened by inflation dynamics: France's 2.16% consumer price increase in 2024 suggests a stable monetary environment anchored by the European Central Bank, whereas Russia's 8.44% inflation reveals the overheating pressures of wartime spending, labor shortages, and a weaker ruble. This price pressure erodes real incomes even as headline growth accelerates, complicating any direct comparison of GDP trajectories. Thus, the turning point is less a single statistic than a constellation of divergences — nominal vs PPP, per-capita chasm, growth vs inflation — that together reframe how analysts should understand the France-Russia economic relationship in the mid-2020s.

Current State

As of the latest verified data for 2024, France's nominal GDP of $3.16 trillion represents the seventh-largest economy globally (World Bank), firmly anchored in the European single market with deep integration into trans-Atlantic financial and trade architectures. Russia's $2.17 trillion places it among the top twelve, but its economic weight is increasingly oriented toward Asia. On a purchasing-power parity basis, however, Russia's $6.93 trillion GDP eclipses France's $4.34 trillion, ranking it as the world's fourth-largest economy by PPP, just behind India and ahead of Germany (IMF, 2024). This PPP advantage is rooted in Russia's vast natural resource endowment and relatively low domestic prices for energy, food, and services, giving its output a multiplier effect that nominal exchange rates miss.

Productivity-adjusted living standards remain dramatically unequal. France's nominal per-capita income of $46,145 is more than three times Russia's $14,880. After PPP adjustment, the gap narrows to 1.34 times — $63,399 in France versus $47,418 in Russia — yet a substantial welfare difference persists. France's high per-capita income supports a comprehensive social security system, universal healthcare, and a pension regime that keeps old-age poverty low (OECD). Russia's lower per-capita figure, even when PPP-adjusted, reflects a more compressed wage structure and limited social safety nets outside energy-producing regions. The difference in life expectancy — 82.93 years in France (2023) versus 73.25 years in Russia — adds a biometric dimension to these economic divergences, as the World Bank's World Development Indicators confirm.

Labor markets present a mirror-image paradox. In 2025, France's unemployment stood at 7.54%, a rate that has fallen steadily over recent years but remains structurally higher than that of Russia's mere 2.13% (World Bank, 2025). Russia's apparently ultra-low joblessness is not a sign of robust labor-market health; rather, it stems from a shrinking working-age population, emigration, and the massive absorption of labor into defense production and import-substitution activities, as highlighted by the Russian Federal State Statistics Service. France's higher unemployment reflects a regulated labor market with strong worker protections, high reservation wages, and a steady influx of young workers, according to Eurostat. Both economies thus face peculiar labor distortions: France, an under-utilization of human capital; Russia, an acute shortage that drives wage inflation in key sectors.

The macroeconomic backdrop is completed by inflation and growth interplay. French inflation at 2.16% in 2024 signals a near-target environment, while Russian inflation at 8.44% points to a central bank struggling to contain demand fueled by fiscal stimulus. The Bank of Russia's key rate, raised to double-digit levels in 2024 to combat price pressures, contrasts with the ECB's cautious easing cycle. These policy stances ripple into exchange rates, credit conditions, and investment climates, reinforcing the divergent trajectory of the two economies even as they share a common global environment marked by geopolitical tension and energy transition.

• Nominal GDP (2024): France $3.16T, Russia $2.17T.
• GDP PPP (2024): France $4.34T, Russia $6.93T.
• GDP per capita (2024): France $46,145, Russia $14,880.
• GDP per capita PPP (2024): France $63,399, Russia $47,418.
• GDP growth (2024): France 1.15%, Russia 4.34%.
• Inflation (2024): France 2.16%, Russia 8.44%.
• Population (2024): France 68.6M, Russia 143.5M.
• Life expectancy (2023): France 82.93 years, Russia 73.25 years.
• Unemployment (2025): France 7.54%, Russia 2.13%.

Indicator	France	Russia	Source & Year
GDP (USD)	$3.16T	$2.17T	World Bank, 2024
GDP PPP (USD)	$4.34T	$6.93T	World Bank, 2024
GDP per capita (USD)	$46,145	$14,880	World Bank, 2024
GDP per capita, PPP (USD)	$63,399	$47,418	World Bank, 2024
GDP growth (%)	1.15	4.34	World Bank, 2024
Inflation (%)	2.16	8.44	World Bank, 2024
Population	68.6M	143.5M	World Bank, 2024
Life expectancy (years)	82.93	73.25	World Bank, 2023
Unemployment (%)	7.54	2.13	World Bank, 2025

Historical Trajectory (1960-2024)

The historical record, drawn from World Bank national accounts data, places the two economies on diverging tracks long before the geopolitical ruptures of the 21st century. In 1960, France's GDP stood at $62.0 billion, a respectable base for a country rebuilding from war and decolonization, with a per-capita income of $1,307. For the Soviet Union, comparable nominal figures are unavailable for that year, but the absence of market exchange rates makes direct comparison with Western economies at that point nearly meaningless. France's post-war expansion, driven by productivity gains and European integration, set the stage for a long period of convergence with its richer neighbors.

By 1980, French GDP had multiplied more than tenfold to $695 billion, with per-capita income soaring to $12,595. The Soviet economy, meanwhile, was stagnating under central planning, burdened by military expenditure and declining total factor productivity, though its size was often overstated by Western intelligence estimates. The lack of reliable Ruble-dollar conversion figures for 1980 in standard World Bank datasets highlights the opacity of the planned economy. France's integration into the European Monetary System and its growing service sector widened the gap with the state-directed industrialization model of the East. The 1980s would see France continue to modernize while the Soviet system faced accelerating internal contradictions.

The Soviet dissolution and Russia's emergence as an independent state produced the first true data-point for direct comparison. In 1990, French GDP reached $1.26 trillion with a per-capita of $21,661, while Russia's first recorded nominal GDP stood at $517 billion, with per-capita income of just $3,494. That ratio — French per-capita income was roughly 6.2 times higher — reflected the sudden exposure of a post-Soviet economy to market prices, hyperinflation, and a collapse of supply chains that slashed output. The 1990s became a lost decade for Russia, whose GDP contracted by over 40% in real terms according to official Russian statistics. Meanwhile, France grew steadily, if unspectacularly, through the Maastricht convergence process preceding the euro.

By 2000, the divergence had deepened dramatically. France's GDP climbed to $1.36 trillion (per-capita $22,421), but Russia's nominal GDP had shrunk to $269 billion, and per-capita income collapsed to $1,835 — far below even the 1990 level. That trough captured the after-effects of the 1998 Russian financial default, which eviscerated savings and credit. The early 2000s, however, marked the beginning of a powerful recovery, fueled by rising oil prices. From 2000 to 2010, Russia's GDP rocketed to $1.58 trillion, with per-capita income surging to $11,054 — a six-fold increase from the nadir. France, too, expanded, reaching $2.65 trillion and $40,842 per capita, but the growth differential narrowed the nominal gap slightly.

The 2010s brought turbulence that affected both states but in distinct ways. The global financial crisis of 2008-2009 had already interrupted France's growth, while Russia's commodity-dependent boom faded after the 2014 oil price crash and the imposition of Western sanctions over Crimea. In 2020, the pandemic year, France's GDP was exactly the same in nominal dollar terms as in 2010 — $2.65 trillion — while per-capita income had actually slipped to $39,200, an erosion driven by exchange-rate depreciation of the euro and the one-off contraction of GDP. Russia's 2020 figure stood at $1.49 trillion, with per-capita at $10,092, barely above the 2010 level and reflecting years of stagnation and renewed sanctions pressure.

The trajectory from 2020 to 2024 reveals the latest chapter: a wartime economy versus a post-pandemic recovery. France's GDP jumped by over $500 billion, reaching $3.16 trillion, with per-capita income rising sharply to $46,145. Russia's economy, despite the shock of 2022, expanded by $680 billion to $2.17 trillion, and per-capita income advanced to $14,880 — both higher than any previous year except possibly the early-2010s peak. This re-acceleration, driven by defense spending and redirected energy exports, has surprised many forecasters. Yet the long-run trend remains clear: France's per-capita income has consistently been a multiple of Russia's, and while the PPP-adjusted gap is narrower, the historical story is one of persistent structural advantage rooted in institutional quality, diversified production, and integration into the global knowledge economy.

Per Capita Reality

Nominal GDP per capita is the bluntest measure of how much output an average resident could command if all resources were distributed equally, a useful fiction that reveals deep structural differences. In 2024, France's $46,145 figure surpassed Russia's $14,880 by a factor of 3.10, according to World Bank data. That gap is not primarily a product of exchange-rate distortions; it reflects a fundamental productivity gap. French workers, embedded in a high-capital, high-technology service economy, produce more value added per hour than their Russian counterparts, who operate in an economy where resource extraction accounts for a large share of GDP but generates fewer high-productivity linkages. The gap has widened from roughly 12 times in 2000 to 3.10 times today, not because Russia stood still — its per-capita income rose from $1,835 to $14,880 — but because France's base moved from $22,421 to $46,145, a doubling that Russia's eight-fold increase could not fully close.

When prices are equalized via purchasing power parity, the narrative shifts but does not reverse. France's PPP-adjusted per-capita income of $63,399 remains 1.34 times Russia's $47,418. The PPP ratio of 1.34x is far smaller than the nominal 3.10x, indicating that Russia's domestic cost of living — particularly for housing, energy, and staple foods — is significantly lower. A Russian household with $47,418 in PPP terms can afford a consumption basket that would cost a French household $63,399. Still, the residual gap signals that after accounting for price levels, the average French resident enjoys roughly a third more material welfare. This difference manifests in access to healthcare, education quality, and durable goods ownership. According to OECD reports, France's social spending as a share of GDP is among the highest in the world, ensuring that even lower-income deciles have safety nets that Russia's more targeted, less comprehensive system cannot match.

The per-capita reality is also shaped by life expectancy and labor market participation. France's life expectancy of 82.93 years in 2023 implies a longer period over which the higher income can be enjoyed, while Russia's 73.25 years, still recovering from the male mortality crisis of the 1990s and 2000s, truncates the effective consumption window. Labor force participation rates are not directly given, but the extremely low Russian unemployment of 2.13% in 2025 suggests a tight labor market; however, that tightness coexists with lower median wages in dollar terms. France's 7.54% unemployment rate indicates slack, but those who are employed work fewer hours on average and enjoy more leisure, as the OECD's time-use surveys show. Thus, the per-capita multiple understates the broader quality-of-life gap if one factors in non-market dimensions.

Regional dispersion within each country further complicates the picture. Île-de-France, the capital region, generates a GDP per capita far above the national average, while Moscow and the oil-rich Yamal-Nenets region skew Russia's mean upward. Both economies exhibit spatial inequality, but Russia's inter-regional income gaps are among the largest in Europe, as documented by the World Bank. The French redistribution system — via progressive taxation and social transfers — compresses these regional income disparities more aggressively than Russia's fiscal federalism, leaving the national per-capita figure more representative of the median household in France than in Russia. Therefore, when analysts compare $46,145 to $14,880, they are not simply comparing two averages; they are comparing two vastly different distributions of income, opportunities, and public goods.

Sector Composition

The sectoral anatomy of the two economies illuminates why nominal and PPP metrics diverge so sharply. In 2024, agriculture accounted for 1.30% of France's GDP and 2.74% of Russia's, according to World Bank figures. While France is the European Union's largest agricultural producer in absolute terms, its farm sector is highly capitalized, exporting wine, cheese, and grain, and contributes a shrinking share of domestic value added. Russia, by contrast, has emerged as a global wheat superpower, and its higher agricultural GDP share reflects not only comparative advantage in fertile black-earth regions but also a lower overall development level where primary production still absorbs a notable proportion of labor and capital. Still, both figures are modest by global standards, indicating that the real differentiator lies in industry and services.

Industry forms the economic backbone of Russia, contributing 30.72% of GDP in 2024, nearly double France's 17.21%. This industrial weight is dominated by fossil fuel extraction, refining, and mineral processing. Gazprom, Rosneft, and Norilsk Nickel are not merely companies but quasi-fiscal agents, channeling rents into state budgets. The oil and gas sector alone accounts for roughly 15-20 percent of Russian GDP and a far higher share of exports and budget revenue, according to the Russian Ministry of Finance. French industry, though smaller in relative terms, is diversified and technology-intensive: aerospace (Airbus), automobile (Stellantis), luxury goods (LVMH, Hermès), and nuclear energy (EDF, Orano) anchor manufacturing. These sectors exhibit higher value-added per worker and are more embedded in global supply chains, a strength that nevertheless renders them vulnerable to trade disruptions. The differential industrial intensity explains much of the PPP puzzle: Russia's extraction industry produces large physical volumes that, when valued at global prices in rubles and then converted using market exchange rates heavily influenced by sanctions, produce a dollar GDP that is less than the true command over resources measured by PPP.

Services are the overwhelming engine of the French economy, generating 70.91% of GDP in 2024, compared to 57.53% in Russia. Finance, insurance, real estate, tourism, healthcare, and public administration employ the majority of the French workforce. Paris is a global hub for banking, insurance, and business services, while the public sector's weight — education, health, social services — stabilizes aggregate demand. Russia's service sector has expanded rapidly since the 1990s, with Moscow developing a modern banking, retail, and IT landscape. However, the large share of state-owned enterprises in banking (Sberbank, VTB) and in media/telecoms shapes a less competitive dynamic. Moreover, the absence of a deep, independently regulated financial market means that Russia's service sector serves primarily domestic circulation rather than export-oriented value creation. This composition difference reinforces the per-capita gap: high-productivity services generate the wages that push French incomes upward, while Russia's service sector contains many low-productivity, low-wage activities outside the capital and energy hubs.

Trade Relationship Between the Two

France and Russia have never been top-tier trading partners, but the relationship was historically significant within the broader EU-Russia commercial framework. Prior to the 2014 imposition of sectoral sanctions, France exported machinery, pharmaceuticals, aerospace products, and luxury goods to Russia, while importing crude oil, refined petroleum, natural gas, and metals. According to Eurostat, EU-28 exports to Russia peaked at around €120 billion in 2012, with Germany, Italy, and France as the largest partners. French customs data recorded that Russia typically accounted for less than 2% of total French merchandise exports, but the concentration in certain sectors — particularly agricultural machinery and aeronautics — made the bilateral channel disproportionately important for specific firms.

The sanctions regime that began after the annexation of Crimea in 2014 and deepened dramatically after the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 radically restructured trade flows. European Council regulations prohibited exports of dual-use goods, technology for the energy sector, and a wide range of industrial equipment to Russia. As a result, French exports to Russia collapsed. Eurostat data show that France's merchandise exports to Russia fell by 44% in 2022 compared to the previous year, and by 2023 had dropped to a fraction of pre-2014 levels. Imports of Russian energy into France also declined sharply: according to the International Energy Agency, Russian pipeline gas supplied roughly 17% of France's gas imports in 2021; by mid-2023, that figure had fallen to near zero as France diversified toward LNG from Norway, Qatar, and the United States. Russian crude oil imports into France, once processed at TotalEnergies' refineries, ceased entirely under EU embargo measures in early 2023.

Russia's trade pivot toward Asia partially filled the void left by European partners. Chinese, Indian, and Turkish imports of Russian crude and coal surged, while Russia replaced Western capital goods with domestic alternatives and supplies from China, according to UN Comtrade data for 2023. French brands that had invested in Russian manufacturing — Renault, Société Générale, Auchan — faced stark choices, with many exiting the market or selling assets at deep discounts. The financial links also severed: Russian banks were disconnected from SWIFT, and French banks' cross-border claims on Russia fell by over 80% between 2021 and 2023, as reported by the Bank for International Settlements. Thus, while nominal GDP figures remain large for both, the bilateral economic interaction shrank to a shadow of its former self, with sanctions acting as a permanent decoupling mechanism that even a hypothetical peace settlement would not quickly reverse.

Yet the trade relationship left a legacy of interdependence in specific niches. French luxury groupes still rely on a small cadre of high-net-worth Russian clients who travel and purchase abroad, though this indirect exposure is minimal at the national level. More consequential is the ongoing role of Russian grain and fertilizers on global markets, which indirectly affects French agricultural producers through price volatility. The WTO's trade monitoring reports indicate that France, as part of the EU, maintains a sanctions-based import ban on many Russian goods, while simultaneously navigating the global inflation in food and energy that Russia's commodity position amplifies. In effect, the two economies are now less connected than at any point since the end of the Cold War, a decoupling that amplifies the divergent trajectories visible in the macroeconomic data.

Demographics & Future Outlook

The demographic foundations of the two economies point toward distinctly different long-term growth capacities. France's population of 68.6 million in 2024 and Russia's 143.5 million give the latter a raw size advantage that could, in theory, support a larger domestic market. However, population dynamics tell a more nuanced story. France has enjoyed modest but positive natural growth for decades, supported by a relatively high fertility rate of around 1.8 children per woman and net immigration. According to UN World Population Prospects, France's working-age population (15-64) is projected to remain broadly stable until the 2030s, after which it will decline slowly. Russia, by contrast, faces a demographic headwind: its fertility rate, after a brief bump from maternity capital policies, has fallen back below 1.5, and mortality rates, reflected in the life expectancy gap of roughly 9.7 years (82.93 versus 73.25 in 2023), are elevated by cardiovascular disease, accidents, and alcohol-related conditions. The Russian State Statistics Service has projected that the working-age cohort will shrink by roughly 7-8 million by 2035, even without accounting for the accelerated emigration of young, educated professionals after 2022.

The shrinking labor supply poses a severe constraint on Russia's medium-term growth potential. With unemployment at a near-frictionless 2.13% in 2025, labor is already a binding bottleneck. Companies across manufacturing, IT, and construction report severe skill shortages, as noted by the Central Bank of Russia's regional surveys. The war economy absorbs a share of able-bodied men, either directly in the armed forces or in defense industries, further tightening civilian labor markets and pushing wages up at an unsustainably rapid clip. Wartime mobilisation also complicates demographic projections: net out-migration in 2022-2023 alone may have removed over half a million economically active individuals, per independent demographers citing Russian border service data. This contrasts with France, where immigration — though politically contentious — has historically provided a flexible buffer, filling gaps in construction, healthcare, and agriculture.

Future outlook, as informed by IMF World Economic Outlook projections and demographic models, suggests that Russia's potential growth rate will trend downward toward 1-1.5% per year in the late 2020s, constrained by demographics, technological isolation, and the elevated cost of capital under sanctions. France's medium-term growth is projected at a similar 1-1.5%, but for different reasons: structural reforms remain incomplete, productivity growth is sluggish, and public debt levels — over 110% of GDP — limit fiscal space for investment. Yet France's institutional resilience, rule of law, and access to EU research and development funding give it a qualitative advantage in navigating transitions such as digitalization and the green economy. Russia's pivot to self-sufficiency and Asian supply chains may sustain certain industrial output, but the absence of deep high-tech ecosystems could crystallize as a permanent technology gap, according to analysis by the OECD and the Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies.

In the near term, the chief uncertainty for both economies is the trajectory of the war in Ukraine and the associated sanctions regime. For France, a further escalation could imperil energy security and raise risk premia on European assets, but the macro-economic hit would likely be absorbable given diversified supply. For Russia, a prolonged conflict means continued fiscal dominance, rising inflation, and a gradual depletion of the National Wealth Fund's liquid reserves. Even with robust PPP metrics, the long-term convergence story — if there is one — hinges on whether Russia can translate its resource wealth into genuine human capital development and technological upgrading, a transition that historical trajectory shows France managed during the latter half of the 20th century, and which the current institutional environment makes unlikely for Russia in the foreseeable future.

FAQ

Which economy is larger, France or Russia?

In nominal USD terms, France's GDP of $3.16 trillion in 2024 is 1.45 times Russia's $2.17 trillion. Measured by purchasing power parity, however, Russia's economy is larger at $6.93 trillion versus France's $4.34 trillion (World Bank, 2024). The answer depends on whether one uses market exchange rates or adjusts for price differences.

Why does Russia's PPP GDP exceed its nominal GDP so dramatically?

Russia's domestic price level for non-tradable goods — energy, housing, basic food — is far lower than in high-income economies. When GDP is recalculated using PPP, each ruble's purchasing power is higher than the market exchange rate suggests. This discrepancy is especially large for resource-rich economies where a share of output is priced at subsidized or low domestic cost, according to the World Bank's International Comparison Program.

How does France's GDP per capita compare to Russia's?

France's nominal GDP per capita stood at $46,145 in 2024, while Russia's was $14,880 — a ratio of 3.10 to 1. After adjusting for PPP, French per-capita income is $63,399 versus $47,418, narrowing the gap to roughly 1.34 times. This still indicates that the average French resident enjoys substantially higher material welfare.

Why is Russia's unemployment rate so low compared to France's?

Russia's 2.13% unemployment rate in 2025 reflects a shrunken working-age population, emigration, and the absorption of labor into defense production and import-substitution industries, rather than a buoyant labor market. France's 7.54% rate is typical of a regulated, high-income economy with strong worker protections and a younger labor-force profile. Both figures mask distinct structural challenges: labor shortages in Russia, and under-employment in France.

What are the main sectors of the French and Russian economies?

In 2024, services accounted for 70.91% of French GDP and 57.53% of Russian GDP. Industry made up 17.21% in France and 30.72% in Russia, with energy and minerals dominating the latter. Agriculture represented 1.30% and 2.74% respectively. The data highlight France's orientation toward services and Russia's reliance on extractive industries.

How much does France rely on Russian energy?

Direct reliance has fallen to near zero since 2022. According to the International Energy Agency, Russian piped gas supplied about 17% of French gas imports in 2021; by 2023 this share had collapsed following EU embargoes. French oil imports from Russia ceased in early 2023. Diversification toward LNG and non-Russian crude has decoupled French energy from Russia.

Has the war in Ukraine hurt Russia's economy more than France's?

Sanctions and war-related disruptions have imposed severe costs on Russia, including restricted access to technology, financial isolation, and capital flight. Yet Russia's GDP grew 4.34% in 2024, while France grew 1.15%. The war-driven fiscal stimulus and high energy prices temporarily boosted Russian output. In the long term, however, analysts from the IMF and OECD suggest that Russia's potential growth will be lower due to demographic erosion and technological decoupling, while France's costs have been more moderate and manageable.

What is the life expectancy gap between France and Russia?

In 2023, life expectancy at birth was 82.93 years in France and 73.25 years in Russia, a difference of 9.68 years (World Bank). The gap is driven by higher mortality from cardiovascular diseases, alcohol-related conditions, and accidents in Russia. French longevity benefits from universal healthcare and healthier lifestyle patterns.

How have sanctions changed France-Russia trade?

Trade plummeted after 2022. French merchandise exports to Russia fell by over 40% in 2022, according to Eurostat, and have remained at historically low levels. Imports of Russian crude oil and gas into France have essentially ceased. Sanctions have decoupled the two economies, with Russia redirecting trade toward Asia and France diversifying its energy and goods suppliers.

Which country has higher inflation?

Inflation in Russia reached 8.44% in 2024, more than triple France's 2.16% (World Bank). Russia's high inflation reflects wartime demand, labor shortages, and ruble depreciation, whereas France benefits from the European Central Bank's inflation-targeting framework and lower fiscal pressure.