Japan vs Russia: GDP, Growth & Trajectory

Turning Point

In 2024, Japan's GDP stood at $4.02T versus Russia's $2.17T — a ratio of 1.85x. That single figure captures a structural pivot in the economic gravity between Northeast Asia and Eastern Europe. A decade earlier, Japan's nominal output was more than three times Russia's; the compression reflects a convergence driven less by Russia's sustained rise than by the erosion of Japan's dollar-denominated economic mass, accelerated by yen depreciation and nearly three decades of low nominal growth. The year 2024 did not produce a clean break, but it crystallised a new equilibrium in which Russia's war economy, high commodity prices, and adaptive fiscal policy combined to generate 4.34% GDP growth, while Japan expanded by just 0.10% — a divergence that reshapes how the two economies are compared.

The ratio of 1.85 obscures a second, more important measure: purchasing power parity. In PPP terms, Russia's GDP exceeded Japan's for the first time in 2024, reaching $6.93T versus $6.49T, according to World Bank data. This inversion is a turning point because it severs the long-standing assumption that Japan's technological and institutional advantages automatically translate into superior economic output. Russia's PPP advantage stems from its larger population, enormous natural resource base, and domestically priced goods and services that are undervalued when converted at market exchange rates. Yet the nominal gap persists because the rouble, beset by sanctions and capital flight, trades far below its PPP-implied level, while the yen weakened to multi-decade lows against the dollar.

For Japan, the turning point is also demographic. In 2024, the population stood at 124.0 million, down from a peak of 128 million in 2008, and the United Nations projects the decline will accelerate. Russia, with 143.5 million, faces a similar fate — its population fell by roughly 1.5 million between 2018 and 2024 — yet the scale of Japan's working-age contraction is steeper. By 2024, the over-65 share of Japan's population reached around 30%, against roughly 17% in Russia, according to national statistical offices. That differential loads a cost onto Japan's fiscal accounts and productivity that no marginal increase in female labour-force participation or robotics investment can fully offset. The turning point, then, is not that Russia has become a more efficient or innovative economy; it is that Japan's long-era of effortless GDP superiority is being squeezed at both ends — by a shrinking labour pool and a cheapening currency.

Geopolitical sanctions deepened the churn in Russia's metrics. After 2022, the severing of trade and financial links forced Russian firms to redirect exports toward China and India, often at discounted prices. Yet the surge in global energy prices in 2022-2023 and the state's spending on defence and import substitution pushed nominal GDP upward even as welfare stagnated. Japan, in contrast, remained a net energy importer, and the higher cost of liquefied natural gas and oil widened its trade deficit, dragging on nominal output. The 2024 figures therefore represent a conjunctural moment when Russia's war-time fiscal expansion and Japan's cost-of-living squeeze met, shrinking the nominal gap to its lowest level since the mid-1990s. This moment is unlikely to be the final word, but it marks a data-driven inflection in the raw arithmetic of global economic rankings.

Current State

As of 2024, Japan and Russia sit in adjacent tiers of the global economy but operate under utterly different constraints. Japan's $4.02 trillion nominal GDP makes it the world's fourth-largest economy, behind Germany and ahead of India. Russia's $2.17 trillion places it in the eleventh position, just above Brazil. Yet the PPP adjustment flips the order: Russia's $6.93 trillion surpasses not only Japan's $6.49 trillion but also Germany's, making it the fourth-largest economy by that measure. Both nations exhibit low official unemployment — Japan's 2.45% in early 2025 and Russia's 2.13% — reflecting acute labour shortages rather than vibrant job creation. Inflation tells a contrasting story: Japan, after decades of deflation, recorded 2.74% in 2024, while Russia's consumer prices leapt 8.44%, driven by supply-chain disruptions, a weak rouble, and fiscal stimulus.

The two economies differ sharply in their industrial structures, as captured by the latest sectoral data. Agriculture accounted for just 0.94% of Japan's GDP in 2023, while industry and services contributed 28.60% and 69.77% respectively. In Russia, agriculture stood at 2.74% of GDP in 2024, industry at 30.72%, and services at 57.53%. Japan's service-heavy profile reflects a mature post-industrial economy dominated by healthcare, finance, retail, and technology. Russia's larger industrial share signals the enduring importance of oil, gas, metals, and defence manufacturing. Life expectancy underscores the social reality behind these numbers: Japan's average life span of 84.0 years in 2023 outpaces Russia's 73.3 years by more than a decade, a gap rooted in differences in healthcare access, diet, and mortality from non-communicable diseases.

A compact fact list illuminates the present:

• GDP (nominal, 2024): Japan $4.02T, Russia $2.17T. Source: World Bank.
• GDP per capita (nominal, 2024): Japan $32,465, Russia $14,880. Source: World Bank.
• GDP per capita, PPP (2024): Japan $52,364, Russia $47,418. Source: World Bank.
• GDP growth (2024): Japan 0.10%, Russia 4.34%. Source: World Bank.
• Inflation (2024): Japan 2.74%, Russia 8.44%. Source: World Bank.
• Unemployment (2025): Japan 2.45%, Russia 2.13%. Source: national statistics agencies compiled in World Bank database.
• Population (2024): Japan 124.0M, Russia 143.5M. Source: World Bank.
• Life expectancy (2023): Japan 84.0 years, Russia 73.3 years. Source: World Bank.

Below is a comparative table of the main macroeconomic aggregates for the latest year:

Indicator	Japan (latest available)	Russia (latest available)
Nominal GDP	$4.02T (2024)	$2.17T (2024)
GDP, PPP	$6.49T (2024)	$6.93T (2024)
GDP per capita (nominal)	$32,465 (2024)	$14,880 (2024)
GDP per capita, PPP	$52,364 (2024)	$47,418 (2024)
GDP growth	0.10% (2024)	4.34% (2024)
Inflation, consumer prices	2.74% (2024)	8.44% (2024)
Unemployment	2.45% (2025)	2.13% (2025)
Population	124.0M (2024)	143.5M (2024)
Life expectancy at birth	84.0 years (2023)	73.3 years (2023)
Agriculture (% of GDP)	0.94% (2023)	2.74% (2024)
Industry (% of GDP)	28.60% (2023)	30.72% (2024)
Services (% of GDP)	69.77% (2023)	57.53% (2024)

The table underscores a paradox: Russia's economy is already larger than Japan's when measured at purchasing power parity, yet its per capita PPP stands below Japan's. The difference arises because Russia supports 19.5 million more people, dispersing its $6.93 trillion output across a larger denominator. The nominal per capita chasm — Japan at $32,465 versus Russia's $14,880 — explains why Japanese households enjoy a materially higher standard of consumption for traded goods and travel, even as Russians benefit from cheaper domestic services and subsidised energy.

Historical Trajectory (1960-2024)

The historical data provided by the World Bank reveals two economies evolving along fundamentally different rhythms. Japan's story from 1960 onward is one of meteoric rise, asset-bubble implosion, and prolonged stagnation. Russia's narrative begins later — the Soviet Union did not report GDP in the same convention — and is scarred by a 1990s collapse, a commodity-driven recovery in the 2000s, and a renewed shock from sanctions. The seven snapshots offered here, for the years 1960, 1980, 1990, 2000, 2010, 2020, and 2024, trace the arc.

In 1960, Japan was still in the early phase of its post-war economic miracle. Nominal GDP stood at $47.4 billion, and per capita income was a modest $509. No comparable data exists for Russia because the USSR relied on the Material Product System; in U.S. dollar terms, any estimate would be distorted by non-convertible ruble exchange rates. By 1980, Japan had transformed into an industrial powerhouse, with GDP reaching $1.13 trillion and per capita income of $9,670 — a more than eighteen-fold increase in nominal terms. This was the era of export-led growth, keiretsu conglomerates, and constant trade friction with the West. The Soviet Union, by contrast, was stagnating, but its measured economy remains invisible in standard World Bank series.

The 1990 snapshot is the first that includes a World Bank estimate for Russia: $517.0 billion in nominal GDP, with a per capita figure of just $3,494. That year Japan had already ballooned to $3.19 trillion and a per capita income of $25,806, having ridden the late-1980s asset bubble to a peak that would soon unwind. The ratio between the two economies in 1990 was roughly 6.2:1 in total size and 7.4:1 in per capita terms. What followed in that decade was a mirror-image divergence: Japan's lost decade(s) began with the collapse of equity and real estate prices, while Russia suffered a traumatic transition from central planning to a market economy. By 2000, Japan's GDP had grown to $4.97 trillion, with per capita income at $39,171, but Russia had shrunk to $269.0 billion — less than its 1990 level — and per capita income had fallen to $1,835. The 1998 default and the rouble crisis wiped out years of painful reform.

The 2000s brought a dramatic reversal. Driven by soaring oil and gas prices, Russia's nominal GDP expanded almost six-fold between 2000 and 2010, reaching $1.58 trillion, while per capita income sprinted to $11,054. Japan continued to advance in nominal terms to $5.76 trillion and a per capita of $45,052, but the pace was far slower. The global financial crisis of 2008-09 hit Russia harder — its GDP contracted by 7.8% in 2009 — but the subsequent rebound was vigorous. By 2010, the Japan/Russia GDP ratio had shrunk to roughly 3.6:1 and the per capita gap to 4.1:1. This was the first decade in which the two economies genuinely moved in opposite directions on growth momentum, even as Japan's absolute size remained far larger.

The 2010-2020 period introduced new headwinds for both. Japan's nominal GDP actually declined — from $5.76 trillion in 2010 to $5.05 trillion in 2020 — as the yen weakened and the demographic drag intensified. Per capita income slipped to $40,094. Russia, meanwhile, was struck by the 2014 oil price collapse and Crimea-related sanctions; its GDP fell from a 2013 peak of $2.29 trillion to $1.49 trillion by 2020, with per capita income stagnating at $10,092. Thus, the decade that should have seen a continuation of the convergence narrative instead delivered mutual deterioration in dollar terms. The COVID-19 pandemic further compressed output in 2020, but the damage was relatively contained: Japan's GDP fell 4.6%, Russia's 2.7%.

The final snapshot, 2024, brings the ratio down to 1.85:1. Japan's nominal GDP of $4.02 trillion is $1.03 trillion smaller than it was in 2010 — a striking illustration of how exchange-rate depreciation and low inflation can hollow out the dollar value of a large, stable economy without a commensurate decline in domestic welfare. Russia, by contrast, clawed back from $1.49 trillion in 2020 to $2.17 trillion in 2024, propelled by the energy-price spike of 2022-2023, a shift in trade towards Asia, and massive fiscal injections into defence and construction. This recovery in dollar terms occurred even as the rouble weakened from artificially supported levels, because export revenues in dollars and euros remained high. Per capita income reached $14,880, still far below Japan's $32,465 but a 47% increase from 2020. The historical trajectory therefore demonstrates that the gap between the two economies is not a smooth narrowing but a series of violent ruptures — Japan's plateau, Russia's 1990s collapse, the commodity boom of the 2000s, and now a sanction-driven reorientation.

The data highlights the asymmetric role of the exchange rate. Japan's GDP in yen has been roughly flat for two decades, but its dollar expression has gyrated with the yen-dollar rate. In 2012, one dollar bought about 80 yen; by 2024, it bought over 150 yen, instantly lowering the dollar value of Japan's nominal output by nearly half. Russia's rouble has experienced even wilder swings, but the link between commodity export proceeds and nominal GDP provides a floor that Japan's manufacturing-heavy economy lacks. This exchange-rate sensitivity is perhaps the single most important factor explaining why the Japan-Russia GDP ratio collapsed from over 10:1 in the mid-1990s to 1.85:1 in 2024.

Per Capita Reality

In nominal terms, the per capita division is stark: Japan's $32,465 in 2024 was 2.18 times Russia's $14,880. That ratio has remained largely stable over the past decade — it was 2.26:1 in 2014 — indicating that while the aggregate GDP gap narrowed, the relative capacity of the average citizen to consume internationally traded goods did not converge. The persistence of the gap stems from the combination of a high-value-added export base in Japan, decades of capital accumulation, and a labour productivity level that, by OECD estimates, remains roughly double Russia's. In 2024, Japan's hourly manufacturing output was among the highest in the world, while Russia's productivity was weighed down by inefficient state-owned enterprises and limited diffusion of modern management practices.

Adjusted for purchasing power, the narrative softens. Japan's PPP-adjusted per capita GDP was $52,364 in 2024, compared with Russia's $47,418 — a gap of only 10.4%. The compression occurs because the World Bank's International Comparison Programme finds that the price level of GDP in Russia is roughly one-third of the U.S. level, whereas Japan's is approximately 80%. In other words, the same bundle of goods and services costs far less in Russia, particularly in housing, utilities, and basic foodstuffs. However, the PPP measure assumes that the consumption basket is identical, which it is not: Japanese households spend more on healthcare, education, and leisure travel, while Russians allocate a larger share to utilities and imported consumer durables now pushed out of reach by the rouble's decline. Thus, the 10% PPP gap may overstate the real-world welfare equivalence, especially for urban middle-class Russians who depend on imported electronics and cars.

The divergence in demographic profiles further colours the per capita story. With a workforce of roughly 68 million, Japan generated $4.02 trillion in 2024; Russia, with a workforce of about 72 million, produced $2.17 trillion. The resulting gap in output per worker — roughly $59,000 versus $30,000 — is larger than the population-weighted per capita gap and highlights the handicap of a resource-driven economy that has not fully reaped the productivity benefits of digitalisation. According to the World Bank's diagnostics, Japan's total factor productivity grew slowly in the 2010s but remains elevated on a level basis, while Russia's has been volatile, punctuated by episodes of rapid efficiency gains during the 2000-2008 boom and subsequent slowdowns after 2014.

For the average citizen, the per capita numbers translate into tangibles. A Japanese employee had an average monthly salary of approximately $2,700 in 2024, whereas a Russian counterpart earned around $800, according to official statistics. Life expectancy — 84.0 years against 73.3 years — reflects the deep imprint of these income differences on health outcomes. Even after accounting for lower costs in Russia, the gap in disposable income remains wide enough to explain divergent patterns of consumption, savings, and emigration: young Russians with high human capital have increasingly sought opportunities abroad, while Japan's net migration remains low but positive for high-skilled workers.

Sector Composition

The economic DNA of the two countries is visible in the sectoral shares. Japan's services sector accounted for 69.77% of GDP in 2023, a share that has risen gradually from 64% in 2000 as manufacturing's relative weight declined. The service economy is anchored by wholesale and retail trade, financial and insurance activities, real estate, and a rapidly expanding healthcare and elder-care sector driven by population aging. Industry — comprising manufacturing, construction, and utilities — contributed 28.60% of GDP in 2023, down from a peak of over 40% in the 1970s. Agriculture, at 0.94%, remains technologically advanced but protected by high tariffs and subsidies, especially for rice, vegetables, and livestock. The tiny agricultural share reflects near-complete urbanisation and extremely high land productivity, though output per farm worker is low by European standards.

Russia presents a different landscape. Industry generated 30.72% of GDP in 2024, only slightly higher than Japan's share, but its composition is skewed toward the extraction and initial processing of hydrocarbons, metals, and minerals. The oil and gas sector alone accounts for roughly 15-20% of GDP, according to the Russian Ministry of Finance and IMF Article IV reports, and a much larger share of fiscal revenue and exports. Manufacturing beyond defence and heavy machinery remains underdeveloped, suffering from low investment rates and sanctions-induced restrictions on foreign technology imports. Services, at 57.53%, encompass government administration, retail, transport, and a sizeable financial sector dominated by state-owned banks. The share of modern business services — IT, consulting, insurance — is considerably smaller than in Japan, though the 2022-2024 policy push for import substitution has spurred growth in domestic software and fintech.

Agriculture accounts for 2.74% of Russia's GDP (2024), a figure that understates its political and geopolitical significance. Since the imposition of countersanctions on EU food products in 2014, Russia has become a major exporter of wheat, sunflower oil, and barley, with harvest volumes reaching record highs. Employment in agriculture, however, remains around 6% of the workforce, indicating low labour productivity compared with the 2% share of employment in Japan's farming sector. The differential in sectoral productivity is a microcosm of the entire economy: Japan's industrial and agricultural workers operate with far more capital and technology per person, producing a smaller volume of commodities but higher value per unit. Russia's resource-intensive structure, by contrast, delivers large volumes of intermediate goods that exert a modest multiplier on domestic wages and consumption.

Trade Relationship Between the Two

Bilateral trade between Japan and Russia has historically been thin, constrained by geography, infrastructure, and the asymmetry of each country's trade alignments. According to UN Comtrade and Japan Customs data, total two-way trade peaked at around $30 billion in 2013, with Japan importing crude oil, liquefied natural gas, coal, and seafood, and exporting passenger vehicles, machinery, and electronic components. Russia typically ran a trade surplus with Japan, reflecting the large share of energy in its export basket. After 2014, trade volumes declined as Japan joined Western sanctions in curtailing technology transfers and suspended cooperation on several Siberian energy projects. By 2021, bilateral trade had shrunk to roughly $15 billion, and the 2022 invasion of Ukraine triggered a near-collapse in many categories.

In 2023 and 2024, Japan's imports of Russian LNG and certain metals continued, but at reduced volumes and under price cap mechanisms, as documented by the Japanese Ministry of Finance and WTO trade monitoring reports. The Japanese government designated Russia a "non-market economy" in certain anti-dumping investigations and banned exports of dual-use items, semiconductors, and luxury goods. As a result, Japan's exports to Russia fell by an estimated 60% from pre-2022 levels, with major automakers parting from the market. Russia, in turn, redirected its energy shipments to China and India, making Japan a marginal buyer. According to UN Comtrade, the share of Japan in Russia's total exports dropped below 2% in 2024, down from around 5% a decade earlier.

Despite the political frost, a few commercial arteries remain open. Japanese trading houses retain minority stakes in liquefaction projects on Sakhalin Island, and banks continue to handle payment settlements for authorised goods. The Far Eastern Russian ports of Vladivostok and Vostochny still receive used Japanese cars and construction machinery, a trade channel that persists because the region's economic gravity pulls toward Northeast Asia rather than Europe. In 2024, Japan Customs reported a modest increase in imports of Russian fertilisers and platinum-group metals, reflecting the difficulty of substituting global supply chains for critical raw materials.

The current trade relationship is thus best described as a skeleton of what existed a decade ago. It is governed not by comparative advantage but by sanctions law and risk-averse corporate behaviour. For Japan, Russia accounts for less than 1% of total trade, a figure so low that the disruption has affected only niche sectors such as marine product wholesalers and used-car exporters on the Sea of Japan coast. For Russia, the loss of Japanese machinery and technology has been more painful, especially for the oilfield services and automotive segments, but Chinese and Turkish suppliers have partially filled the gap, according to national customs data. The two economies are decoupling, and the minimal trade shares suggest that any future thaw would have to rebuild supply chains from a very low base.

Demographics & Future Outlook

No metric matters more for long-run economic potential than the size and structure of the working-age population, and on this front both Japan and Russia face severe headwinds. Japan's population in 2024 was 124.0 million, down 1.1 million from the 2020 census. The shrinkage is projected to continue: by 2050, the United Nations medium variant forecasts a population as low as 100 million, with the over-65 share nearing 38%. In 2024, Japan's working-age population (15-64) was approximately 58%, having declined from 69% in 1990. The government has deployed an array of countermeasures — raising the retirement age, easing visa rules for foreign workers in select sectors, and promoting robotics — but net inward migration remains modest, and the total fertility rate hovers around 1.3, far below the 2.1 replacement level.

Russia's demographic profile is marginally less acute but still deeply concerning. The population of 143.5 million in 2024 represents a steady decline from a post-Soviet peak of about 148.9 million in 1992. According to Rosstat, the working-age cohort has shrunk by nearly 4 million since 2015, and the fertility rate, briefly boosted by the "maternity capital" programme, slipped below 1.5 after 2020. Life expectancy at 73.3 years in 2023 — while improved from 65.5 in 2005 — remains far below Japan's 84.0 years, reflecting high mortality from cardiovascular disease, alcohol-related conditions, and, more recently, conflict-related casualties. The loss of prime-age men to emigration and the war in Ukraine further distorts the labour supply. In 2024, official unemployment touched a historic low of 2.13%, not because of strong demand but because the pool of available workers has contracted sharply.

The IMF World Economic Outlook and World Bank long-term projections paint a subdued picture for both economies. For Japan, potential growth is estimated at around 0.5% per annum in the next decade, contingent on continued corporate investment and a gradual increase in service exports. Without a revival in productivity growth, nominal GDP measured in dollars may stagnate further if the yen remains weak. For Russia, the IMF's April 2024 World Economic Outlook projected potential growth of 0.8-1.2% in the medium term, assuming sanctions persist and technology imports remain constrained. The 2024 growth spurt of 4.34% is viewed by the IMF as temporary, fuelled by state-led spending and inventory rebuilding, rather than a sustainable expansion of the civilian economy.

The demographic crunch colours the fiscal outlook. Japan's public debt exceeded 250% of GDP in 2024, according to the Ministry of Finance, yet its low-interest-rate environment and captive domestic savings pool have so far prevented a crisis. As the working-age population shrinks, however, the tax base narrows, and social security spending rises inexorably. Russia's fiscal position appears healthier on paper — gross debt was around 17% of GDP in 2024 — but the war expenditure increasingly loads the budget with military-industrial obligations that do not produce future-oriented productivity gains. Both governments, therefore, face a similar bind: the demographic drag will reduce the denominator of GDP per capita, but the numerator — total output — is unlikely to grow fast enough to offset the rising dependency burden. The future outlook, stripped of political rhetoric, is one of prolonged low-speed convergence in nominal per capita terms, with Russia's temporary advantage in aggregate PPP being progressively eroded by its own adverse demographic trends and the compounding effect of technological isolation.

FAQ

Which economy is bigger, Japan or Russia?

By nominal GDP, Japan is larger. In 2024, Japan's GDP was $4.02 trillion and Russia's $2.17 trillion, giving a ratio of 1.85:1. However, by purchasing power parity (PPP), which adjusts for price differences, Russia's economy exceeded Japan's — $6.93 trillion versus $6.49 trillion — in 2024, according to World Bank data.

Why is Japan's GDP per capita so much higher than Russia's?

In nominal terms, Japan's GDP per capita ($32,465 in 2024) is 2.18 times Russia's ($14,880). The gap reflects Japan's higher labour productivity, more capital-intensive production, and a stronger currency when measured against the U.S. dollar. Even after adjusting for lower domestic prices in Russia, Japan's per capita PPP still leads ($52,364 against $47,418), albeit by a narrower margin.

How did Russia's GDP per capita change after 2014?

Following the oil price decline and the imposition of sanctions in 2014, Russia's nominal GDP per capita fell from a peak of about $16,000 in 2013 to $10,092 in 2020. It then rebounded to $14,880 in 2024, a recovery driven by higher commodity prices and fiscal stimulus, according to World Bank figures.

Does Russia have a larger economy than Japan in PPP terms?

Yes. In 2024, Russia's GDP in PPP was $6.93 trillion, while Japan's was $6.49 trillion, making Russia's economy about 6.8% larger by that metric. The crossover occurred in 2024, marking the first year Russia surpassed Japan in PPP since comparable data became available.

What does the sector composition reveal about these economies?

Japan is highly service-oriented, with services contributing 69.77% of GDP in 2023, industry 28.60%, and agriculture only 0.94%. Russia's 2024 split is 57.53% services, 30.72% industry, and 2.74% agriculture. The larger share of industry in Russia reflects the dominant role of oil, gas, and metals extraction, while Japan's economy is more diversified into finance, healthcare, and technology.

Why do exchange rates matter so much for the GDP comparison?

Nominal GDP is converted at market exchange rates, which can swing dramatically. Japan's yen weakened from about 80 per dollar in 2012 to over 150 in 2024, slashing the dollar value of its GDP by nearly half without equivalent changes in domestic output. The rouble has also been volatile, especially during crises. These exchange-rate movements explain why the nominal GDP ratio narrowed from roughly 10:1 in the mid-1990s to 1.85:1 in 2024, even though Japan's real output grew modestly over that period.

How much bilateral trade exists between Japan and Russia?

Bilateral trade is minimal. Prior to 2014, two-way trade peaked at around $30 billion. After successive sanctions rounds and Japan's adoption of export controls, trade has shrunk to an estimated range of $5-8 billion in 2023-2024, according to Japanese customs data and UN Comtrade. Each country accounts for less than 2% of the other's total trade.

What are the demographic prospects for these economies?

Both face population decline and aging. Japan's population stood at 124.0 million in 2024 and is projected to fall below 100 million by mid-century, with the elderly share above 35%. Russia's 2024 population of 143.5 million is also shrinking, and its working-age cohort has contracted as a result of low births and emigration. These trends will constrain potential growth for both nations over the long term.

Which economy has lower unemployment?

As of early 2025, both recorded very low unemployment: Japan 2.45% and Russia 2.13%. These figures reflect acute labour shortages driven by demographic decline rather than strong job creation, a common pattern in rapidly aging economies.

How does inflation differ between Japan and Russia?

Japan's inflation rate was 2.74% in 2024, a level not seen in decades, largely driven by higher import costs for energy and food. Russia's inflation reached 8.44% in the same year, propelled by a weaker rouble, supply disruptions, and expansive fiscal policy. Over the post-2000 period, Japan has consistently exhibited lower inflation — and until 2022, frequently deflation — while Russia has endured repeated bouts of high inflation.